Rachel Riley v Laura Murray

In a libel claim, serious harm under Defamation Act 2013, section 1 must be proved as a fact by reference to actual impact and all relevant circumstances. Social-media republication and credible reactions may support an inference of serious harm. For a truth defence, the single-meaning rule for the words complained of does not automatically govern the meaning of source material relied upon. Where source material is ambiguous, presenting one interpretation as an unequivocal fact may be a material misrepresentation. Honest opinion requires a factual premise that is proved true or privileged. The public-interest defence requires a reasonable belief in publication’s public interest, assessed in all the circumstances. Political speech receives weight, but it does not excuse misrepresentation or remove the need to use the statutory safeguards.

The claimant sued over a Tweet in which the defendant described her as having publicly stated that Jeremy Corbyn deserved to be violently attacked and as dangerous and stupid. Preliminary issues were determined in a judgment dated 24 April 2020, reported at [2020] EMLR 20. The factual allegation and opinion were held defamatory. At trial, the court considered serious harm, truth under section 2, honest opinion under section 3, publication on a matter of public interest under section 4, and damages. The central issue was whether the defendant had accurately represented an ambiguous source Tweet.

1. Serious harm. The claimant proved as a fact that publication had caused serious harm under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013. The court assessed the totality of the evidence, including the gravity of the meaning, the claimant’s position, the circumstances and scale of publication, social-media reactions and republication. Serious harm could be inferred from the evidence and was not merely a numbers exercise, consistent with Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2020] AC 612 and Turley v Unite the Union [2019] EWHC 3547 (QB).
2. Truth. The defendant had to prove the essential sting of the Factual Allegation substantially true under section 2. The single-meaning rule remained appropriate for determining the meaning of the publication complained of, but whether it should be applied to earlier source material was context-specific. The source Tweet was genuinely ambiguous. By presenting one interpretation as an unequivocal factual account, and adding that Mr Corbyn deserved to be violently attacked, the defendant materially misrepresented it. The truth defence therefore failed.
3. Honest opinion. Sections 3(2) and 3(3) were satisfied, but section 3(4)(a) was not. The facts stated as the basis of an opinion had to be proved true or otherwise protected, although the provision allowed some latitude and did not require every supporting fact to be proved. It did not permit reliance on an unrelated true fact where the stated factual premise was false. The defendant honestly held the opinion, but her honest opinion defence failed. The judge’s observations on the section 3(5) allegation of malice were unnecessary and obiter.
4. Public interest. The three questions under section 4 were whether the statement concerned a matter of public interest, whether the defendant believed publication was in the public interest, and whether that belief was reasonable. The first two questions were answered affirmatively. The third was not. The defendant’s omission of the source Tweet deprived readers of its context and ambiguity. That was not excused by editorial judgment or the fast-moving nature of Twitter. Political speech was important, but freedom of expression was not an overriding answer where reputation was harmed and statutory safeguards were not satisfied.
5. Remedy. The claimant was awarded £10,000 damages. Her provocative and ambiguous source Tweet was relevant to the assessment, but the circumstances did not justify nominal damages. No injunction was pursued.

1. High Court (Queen’s Bench Division). Preliminary issues were determined on 24 April 2020 in a judgment reported at [2020] EMLR 20.
2. Court of Appeal. Permission to appeal the preliminary-issues determination was refused on 27 August 2020.
3. High Court (Queen’s Bench Division). Following trial, the claim succeeded and £10,000 damages were awarded.