Andrew Bridgen v Matt Hancock

Summary judgment is inappropriate where a claim or defence raises fact-sensitive, evidential or evaluative issues carrying a realistic prospect of success. The court must not conduct a mini-trial and should consider evidence reasonably expected to be available at trial.

In a libel claim, serious harm under Defamation Act 2013 section 1 requires a causal link between the publication and reputational harm. It may be established by evidence or factual inference, including in mass-publication cases.

The honest-opinion defence under section 3 gives wide protection to opinions. The opinion need not be true, reasonable, rational or fair, but must have a factual basis. The claimant may still prove that the defendant did not genuinely hold it.

Mr Bridgen brought a libel claim concerning a tweet by Mr Hancock describing an unnamed MP’s vaccination-related comments as antisemitic, anti-vax, anti-scientific and dangerous. Earlier proceedings determined the publication’s meaning and allowed amendment to plead reference innuendo.

Mr Hancock applied for summary judgment on serious harm and on the statutory defence of honest opinion. He also sought summary judgment or strike-out of Mr Bridgen’s counter-defence that the opinion was not genuinely held. The central questions were whether those issues had no real prospect of success and whether there was any compelling reason to determine them before trial.

1. Application refused. The court refused summary judgment on serious harm, the honest-opinion defence and the section 3(5) counter-defence. The claim was to proceed to trial, subject to amendment of defective pleadings.
2. Under CPR 24.3, the question was whether the relevant case was unreal, rather than whether it was likely to succeed. The court had to avoid a mini-trial, consider evidence reasonably expected at trial and determine a short legal issue only where the evidence was sufficient and there was no compelling reason for a trial.
3. Serious harm under section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 was fact-specific and included causation. The claimant had to establish that the publication caused, or was likely to cause, serious reputational harm. Harm concerned the effect of the publication on publishees’ minds, although adverse actions could be evidence of that effect. Inferences could be drawn from the gravity of the allegation, scale and circumstances of publication, the claimant’s position and the likely identity of publishees.
4. The pleaded case was not unreal. Although the reference-innuendo case created a difficult causation issue in this “calling out” claim, it was realistically arguable that Mr Hancock’s high-profile intervention could have altered readers’ views about Mr Bridgen. The issue required factual evidence and evaluative judgment at trial.
5. The honest-opinion defence under section 3 was deliberately broad. An opinion need not be true, fair, reasonable, rational, carefully researched or free from malice. The relevant questions remained whether an honest person could have held the opinion on the pleaded facts under section 3(4)(a), and whether the defendant actually held it under section 3(5). Motivation, spite or unreasonableness could be evidence of lack of genuine belief, although they did not themselves defeat the defence.
6. Whether the description “antisemitic in character” was an opinion an honest person could hold, and whether Mr Hancock genuinely held it, involved evaluative and evidential questions unsuitable for interlocutory determination. The pleaded section 3(5) case therefore had a real prospect of success in part. The alleged wider animus, without a pleaded connection to Mr Hancock’s tweet, was incapable of supporting that counter-defence and was liable to be struck out or amended.
7. Mr Bridgen was given a limited opportunity to submit abbreviated and focused amendments to the Reply and section 3(5) counter-defence. The court declined to decide the merits before trial.