Andrew Bridgen v Matt Hancock

Under section 3(4) of the Defamation Act 2013, the question whether an opinion could be held by an honest person is an objective one for the court. It is decided by reference to relevant facts existing at publication, rather than evidence of opinions expressed by third parties, working definitions, or the defendant’s alleged political purpose. The statutory latitude is wide and can protect an irrational or unreasonable but pertinent opinion.

Section 3(5) defeats the defence only where the claimant proves that the defendant did not actually hold the opinion. That allegation is akin to dishonesty and requires pleaded facts showing a probability of non-belief. Objective unreasonableness, recklessness, hostile motive, or the absence of a plea of truth will not, without more, meet that standard.

Andrew Bridgen sued Matt Hancock in libel over a tweet describing an unnamed MP’s vaccine-related comments as antisemitic in character. The High Court held that the relevant words were an opinion, but refused summary judgment on Mr Hancock’s defence of honest opinion and on Mr Bridgen’s section 3(5) plea: [2025] EWHC 926 (KB).

Mr Hancock appealed. The central questions were whether an honest person could regard Mr Bridgen’s Holocaust comparison as antisemitic in character under section 3(4) of the Defamation Act 2013, and whether Mr Bridgen had a viable case that Mr Hancock did not genuinely hold that opinion under section 3(5).

1. Appeal allowed. The court set aside the refusal of summary judgment, struck out the Reply, and entered summary judgment for Mr Hancock.

2. Section 3(4) requires an objective judgment. The court must decide for itself whether an honest person could hold the opinion on the relevant facts existing at publication. It must not admit evidence of reactions or opinions expressed by third parties, whether about the statement in issue or similar statements. Such evidence does not assist the hypothetical-person inquiry and would create costly satellite disputes. Nor could the Doctors’ Letter, the IHRA material, or Mr Hancock’s alleged political purpose determine the outer limits of honest opinion.

3. The statutory wording permits reliance on relevant facts beyond those stated in the opinion itself. The undisputed facts about the Holocaust, the pandemic and the vaccine programme were relevant to the character of the tweet. Applying the broad latitude recognised in Riley v Murray [2022] EWCA Civ 1146, the court held that an honest person could regard the comparison as minimising or trivialising the Holocaust and, therefore, as antisemitic in character. No trial was needed to resolve that issue.

4. Section 3(5) is a dishonesty disqualification. It applies only if the claimant proves that the defendant did not hold the opinion expressed. The allegation requires cogent pleaded facts which raise a probability of dishonesty, rather than evidence equally consistent with honest belief. The objective unreasonableness of an opinion cannot establish non-belief after the court has held that an honest person could hold it. Recklessness is not an alternative statutory test.

5. A hostile motive may be evidentially relevant, but was insufficient here. The alleged lack of a truth plea, the language and timing of the tweet, purported definitions of antisemitism, and the conduct or views of others did not support an inference that Mr Hancock lacked the belief he expressed. As Mr Bridgen had disclosed no sufficient case to answer, Mr Hancock bore no evidential burden to explain his state of mind.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed Mr Hancock’s appeal, struck out Mr Bridgen’s Reply, and entered summary judgment for Mr Hancock: [2026] EWCA Civ 991 .

• High Court, King’s Bench Division, Media and Communications List: Collins Rice J dismissed Mr Hancock’s applications for summary judgment on the honest-opinion defence and for summary judgment or strike-out of the section 3(5) plea: [2025] EWHC 926 (KB) .

• High Court, King’s Bench Division: An earlier pleading on identification was struck out by Steyn J: [2024] EWHC 623 (KB) . A later preliminary-issues judgment determined the meaning and nature of the tweet: [2024] EWHC 1603 (KB) .