Andrew Bridgen v Matt Hancock

In determining the meaning of a political tweet, the court must adopt the perspective of the ordinary reasonable reader and assess the publication as a whole, including its immediate context. The exercise is objective and impressionistic, rather than literal, subjective or lawyerly. Rhetorical and value-laden language does not become factual merely because some words could be measured against external standards. Strong condemnation may convey an opinion about what was said without alleging a settled fact about the speaker’s character, beliefs or convictions. The distinction between fact and opinion is likewise objective and depends on substance and context. Where a publication contains both, the court must identify the single natural and ordinary meaning and separate factual assertions from evaluative comment.

Andrew Bridgen brought a libel claim concerning a tweet posted by Matt Hancock on 11 January 2023. Hancock described anti-vaccination comments by an unnamed sitting MP as disgusting, dangerous, antisemitic and anti-scientific conspiracy theories. Bridgen contended that the tweet alleged, as fact, that he was an antisemite. Hancock contended that it expressed his opinion that the comments were antisemitic in nature.

At a preliminary-issues hearing, the court determined the tweet’s single natural and ordinary meaning and whether the meaning comprised allegations of fact or expressions of opinion. The court proceeded without determining referability at trial.

1. Meaning. The court held that the ordinary reasonable reader would read the tweet as referring to something an unnamed MP had said that morning about vaccination. The tweet conveyed that the comment was baseless, unscientific, dangerous and offensive, including because it was antisemitic.
2. Objective and contextual approach. The meaning of a tweet is determined objectively by considering the publication as a whole and the context in which an ordinary reasonable reader would encounter it. Tweets call for an impressionistic reading, but the reader is neither naïve nor suspicious. The publisher’s intention is irrelevant. The court must avoid literalism, strained interpretation and over-elaborate analysis.
3. Fact and opinion. The assertion that an unnamed MP had said something related to vaccination that morning was factual. The characterisation of the comment as baseless, unscientific, dangerous, offensive and antisemitic was evaluative opinion. The epithets referred to the mode or character of the expression, not to the MP’s convictions, beliefs, intentions or settled personal character.
4. Political speech. Strong and even vehement language in reactive political commentary is not, without more, an assertion of underlying factual realities. A reasonable reader may allow for the possibility of a single mistake or misstatement and distinguish condemning a comment from impugning the speaker’s wholesale integrity or morality.
5. Defamation Act 2013. The parties accepted, and the court agreed, that the publication had defamatory tendency at common law. As an expression of opinion, the first and second conditions in section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013 were fulfilled because the tweet indicated the basis of the opinion by referring to what had been said by a sitting MP that morning.

The preliminary determinations were made without deciding whether the publication was legally referable to Bridgen.