Prospect v Andrew Evans

A trade union may sue a member in defamation. Section 10 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 gives a union sufficient separate, quasi-corporate legal personality to sue in tort and protects a reputation distinct from that of its members.

Meaning is assessed by the single natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the hypothetical reasonable reader. A statement may refer to both a union and its officers. An allegation at Chase level 2 may still be defamatory. Whether words are fact or opinion depends on their context, and the basis of an opinion may be indicated in general terms. Malicious falsehood has a different approach to meaning, and determining the available meaning may be premature without evidence from the relevant publishees.

Prospect, a trade union, brought claims in libel and malicious falsehood concerning a fundraising-page publication by Andrew Evans alleging that offences had been identified in the union’s annual returns.

The court determined preliminary issues concerning whether a union member could defame the union, the meaning and reference of the publication, whether it was defamatory, whether it contained fact or opinion, and whether the basis of any opinion was indicated. The court also considered whether it was appropriate to determine at this stage the meaning available to publishees for the malicious falsehood claim.

1. Trade union’s capacity to sue. The court was bound by the earlier decision in Prospect v Evans [2024] EWHC 1533 (KB). Section 10(1) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 gives a trade union sufficient quasi-corporate personality to sue and be sued in tort in its own name. Section 10(2) does not prevent that result where the authority is found in Part I of the Act. A union therefore has a reputation distinct from its members and a member can defame it.
2. Meaning and reference. Applying the ordinary reasonable reader test, the publication conveyed that there were reasonable grounds for thinking that the union was guilty of criminal offences concerning its annual returns over three years; that a lawyer had advised that there was a case to answer; and that funds would be used for initial prosecution steps. Although the words referred to those responsible for completing the returns, the publication as a whole referred to and implicated the union itself.
3. Defamatory meaning. The meaning was Chase level 2, rather than an allegation of established guilt. That remained defamatory because an allegation of reasonable grounds to suspect criminal wrongdoing would tend to lower the union in the estimation of right-thinking people and have a substantially adverse effect on how it was treated.
4. Fact, opinion and basis. Read contextually, the publication was partly opinion and partly fact. The opinion was based, in general terms, on the annual returns and legal advice, satisfying the relevant requirement in section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013.
5. Malicious falsehood. The meaning rules differ from defamation. Because the relevant publishees were likely to be identifiable, evidence of the meaning actually attributed to the publication would be relevant. It was premature to determine the issue as a preliminary matter.

The preliminary issues were determined accordingly. No determination was made on issue (7). The parties were directed to lodge an agreed consequential order, or rival drafts and submissions, within seven days.

The judgment records an earlier interlocutory decision in the same proceedings. Steyn J dismissed the defendant’s application in Prospect v Evans [2024] EWHC 1533 (KB), holding that the claimant could bring a defamation claim. No appeal had been brought, and the present court held itself bound by that decision.