North London Central Mosque Trust (A Charity) v Policy Exchange & Anor

An unincorporated charitable trust has no separate legal personality and cannot sue for libel in its own name. Trustees cannot cure that fundamental lack of capacity by suing representatively on behalf of the trust, because the trust itself has no claim to represent. Trade union authorities provide no general analogy where Parliament has expressly conferred capacity to sue or be sued. The question of legal personality must be resolved before considering whether the trust has a reputation capable of protection.

The defendants applied for a ruling that the North London Central Mosque Trust lacked capacity to sue. The claimant accepted that it could not sue in its own name but contended that the trustees could bring the defamation claim on behalf of the trust. The central issue was whether a charitable trust constituted a legal entity or had sufficient legal personality to maintain a libel action.

1. The defendants’ application succeeded. The claimant lacked capacity and was not an entity capable of suing for libel.
2. The court held that a charitable trust is not a separate legal person. It consists of obligations imposed on trustees to hold property for charitable purposes. Relevant contracts and commitments are therefore those of the trustees personally.
3. The lack of capacity was substantive rather than merely procedural. Trustees could not confer on the trust a capacity which it did not possess by bringing proceedings in a representative capacity. A representative claimant must have a claim to represent.
4. The existence of a loose, non-legal reputation associated with a charity did not alter the analysis. The question whether the trust was a legal entity had to be determined first; only a legal entity could have a reputation relevant to a libel claim.
5. The trade union authorities, including Taff Vale Railway Co v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426, were distinguishable. Parliament had specially conferred capacity to sue or be sued on trade unions, whereas no such capacity had been conferred generally on charitable trusts.
6. The defendants were entitled to the costs of the action from its commencement, including the costs thrown away by the adjournment before Sharp J. Costs were to be assessed if not agreed. Permission to appeal was to be sought in writing within 14 days.

not stated in the judgment.