Bokova v Associated Newspapers Ltd

Once a court has determined a publication’s actual single meaning as a preliminary issue, a truth defence must address whether the resulting imputation is substantially true. A defendant cannot retain or introduce a different Lucas-Box or common-sting meaning to reinterpret that determination.

Particulars supporting a reasonable-suspicion imputation must plead primary facts which, viewed cumulatively and objectively, link the claimant’s conduct to the suspicion. Repetition of another person’s allegation, suspicion or conclusion is insufficient. Circumstantial facts concerning others may nevertheless be pleaded where they have a sufficient evidential nexus to the claimant.

The claimant brought libel proceedings over print and online articles published by the defendant. Dingemans J had determined the articles’ natural and ordinary meanings as a preliminary issue in [2018] EWHC 320 (QB). The defendant then amended its defence of truth under section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013, retaining amended Lucas-Box meanings and extensive particulars.

The claimant applied under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b) to strike out the disputed meanings, substantial parts of the particulars of truth and material pleaded in mitigation of damages. The defendant also sought permission to amend its Defence. The principal questions were whether alternative meanings remained permissible after the preliminary determination and whether the pleaded facts could support the statutory truth defence or mitigation of damages.

1. The strike-out application was granted in part. Once the actual single meaning had been judicially determined, the only permissible truth defence was that the resulting imputation or imputations were substantially true. Amended Lucas-Box meanings which varied, reinterpreted or supplemented the court’s determination served no legitimate purpose and risked obstructing the just disposal of the proceedings. The pleaded Lucas-Box meanings were therefore struck out: paras [34]–[45].

2. A defendant wishing to rely on a common-sting meaning must advance it at the preliminary trial of meaning. It cannot resurrect an additional meaning afterwards. The asserted meaning concerning general support for Azerbaijan was, in any event, a separate imputation rather than a common sting of the specific imputations found by Dingemans J: paras [42]–[44].

3. Under section 2(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, the defendant must prove the substantial truth of the imputation. The court isolates its essential core without requiring proof of every immaterial detail. At the pleading stage, the question is whether the particulars are capable of doing so: paras [27]–[28], [37]–[41].

4. For a reasonable-suspicion imputation, the defendant must plead primary facts which objectively provide reasonable grounds for suspicion. The facts must, taken cumulatively, contain an evidential link to the claimant. Circumstantial evidence about other persons may contribute where that nexus exists. Another person’s allegation, belief, investigation or conclusion cannot itself serve as a primary fact: paras [23]–[25].

5. The particulars concerning the appointment of the UNESCO official and the alleged tainted funds were, with specified exceptions, capable of supporting the relevant imputations and were retained. References to the conclusions of an internal report and to a bank’s implied suspicion were struck out under the repetition rule. A plea alleging only reasonable grounds to suspect the claimant’s knowledge was also struck out because actual knowledge had to be pleaded and proved as a primary fact: paras [65]–[72], [78]–[87].

6. Material concerning a governmental review was struck out. It relied on reported conclusions rather than primary facts and could not be admitted in mitigation merely to show that other publications had damaged the claimant’s reputation: paras [89]–[90]. The remaining disputed amendment concerning changes to the online article was allowed: para [93].

• High Court: In this judgment, the court struck out the defendant’s alternative Lucas-Box meanings and selected particulars, retained most of the substantive particulars of truth, and allowed the remaining disputed amendment.
• Earlier preliminary issue: Dingemans J determined the natural and ordinary meanings of the print and online articles in [2018] EWHC 320 (QB). That decision formed an earlier stage of the same proceedings.