Spicer v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis

For the statutory defence of truth, the court must determine whether the defamatory imputation conveyed by the publication is substantially true. The court must prove the essential sting of that imputation, although minor inaccuracies at the edges may be disregarded. A criminal acquittal does not determine the facts for a later civil libel claim, particularly where the criminal and civil issues differ.

For an imputation of reasonable grounds to suspect criminal conduct, the defendant must prove objectively judged primary facts giving rise to the suspicion. A contemporaneous report of public court proceedings may attract statutory privilege, even where it includes extraneous material, provided that material does not deprive the report of fairness and accuracy. Serious harm under the Defamation Act 2013 requires proof that the publication complained of caused the serious reputational harm.

The claimant brought a libel claim against the Commissioner concerning a Metropolitan Police press release published after the claimant’s criminal trial. The release stated that the claimant and another driver had raced high-performance cars before the other driver fatally struck a pedestrian. The claimant had been acquitted of causing death and serious injury by dangerous driving but convicted of careless driving.

At an earlier meaning hearing, Warby J held that the article conveyed imputations that the claimant had raced, driven at almost 70 mph, failed to stop, and was reasonably suspected of causing death and serious injury by dangerous driving. The issues at trial were whether the meanings were substantially true, whether the article was privileged, and whether it caused serious harm.

1. Truth. The defendant succeeded on the defence under s 2 of the Defamation Act 2013. The relevant question was whether the two imputations identified by Warby J were substantially true. The court rejected the submission that the defamatory sting could be narrowed to exclude the allegation of racing. Racing was a central part of the imputation, not a peripheral detail.
2. The evidence established that the claimant and Reza drove high-performance BMWs at speeds approaching 70 mph in a 30 mph urban area, that the claimant followed Reza after being overtaken, accelerated markedly, maintained an unsafe gap, and then drove past the collision, made an illegal turn and concealed his vehicle. Those matters justified the inference that the drivers were racing. The allegation that they raced to see who had the fastest car was an inaccuracy at the edge and did not defeat substantial truth. The claimant was also showing off to his passengers. The article’s statement that he had been arrested was inaccurate, but immaterial.
3. The criminal acquittal did not determine the civil issue. The jury’s verdict did not constitute positive findings about the claimant’s conduct, and the criminal offences required proof of causation and other matters which were not part of the civil imputation.
4. For the Chase level two imputation, the defendant proved objectively judged primary facts giving rise to reasonable grounds to suspect the claimant of causing death and serious injury by dangerous driving. The defence therefore succeeded on both imputations.
5. Privilege. The relevant parts of the article were a report of public criminal proceedings, including the evidence, prosecution case and outcome. Under s 14 of the Defamation Act 1996, the report was fair and accurate and published contemporaneously. The extraneous references to racing and showing off did not deprive the privileged material of fairness or accuracy. The article was therefore absolutely privileged.
6. Serious harm. In any event, the claimant failed to prove under s 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 that publication of this article caused serious harm. The evidence did not distinguish the article’s impact from the extensive contemporaneous reporting, the criminal prosecution, existing university discussion and a more serious MailOnline publication.
7. There was judgment for the defendant.

First-instance judgment. The judgment records earlier interlocutory and meaning decisions in the same litigation, including [2019] EWHC 1439 (QB) and [2020] EWHC 1778 (QB).