Dhir v Saddler

In a slander claim, words imputing a threat to kill can be actionable per se where the offence is complete when the threat is made; the threat need not be carried out. The words are construed in their ordinary or vulgar import, subject to context. Under s.1 Defamation Act 2013, serious harm is assessed at publication. In small-scale publication, the quality and identity of the publishees, and the likelihood of repetition, may matter more than their number. A seriously defamatory meaning supports an inference of serious harm, which can be displaced by appropriate evidence. Any residual proportionality objection belongs to the Jameel abuse jurisdiction. Evidence of misconduct in the relevant sector may mitigate damages if properly before the court, even where a truth defence fails.

This was a first-instance slander claim arising from words spoken by Bronte Saddler at a Seventh Day Adventist Church meeting. The words were admitted, and their meaning had been determined before trial as alleging that Raj Dhir had threatened to slit Saddler’s throat.

The court had to decide whether the words were actionable per se, the extent of publication, serious harm under s.1 Defamation Act 2013, abuse of process, the statutory defence of truth, and damages. The central factual issue was whether Dhir had made the alleged threat at an earlier family meeting.

The claim succeeded. The defence of truth failed and the claimant was awarded £35,000 damages.

1. Actionable per se. A threat to slit another person’s throat imputed the offence of making a threat to kill under s.16 Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The offence was complete when the threat was made, provided the requisite intention existed; it was unnecessary for the threat to be carried out. The court applied the established rule in Webb v Bevan (1883) 11 QBD 609 and the principle in Colman v Godwin (1783) 3 Doug.K.B. 90 that words are assessed by their vulgar import rather than a technical legal meaning. Context could negate a criminal imputation, but none did so here.
2. Serious harm. Applying Lachaux v Independent Print Limited [2017] EWCA Civ 1334, serious harm was assessed at publication and the grave meaning supported an inference of serious reputational harm. In small-scale publication, the quality and identity of publishees mattered more than their number. The claimant was identifiable to the 90 publishees, and the defendant produced no evidence capable of displacing the inference.
3. Abuse of process. A limited publication could be considered under the Jameel v Dow Jones and Co Inc [2005] QB 946 jurisdiction, but this was a serious allegation with substantial value in vindication. Strong evidence was required for a collateral-purpose abuse, and none was provided.
4. Truth. Under s.2 Defamation Act 2013, the defendant bore the burden of proving substantial truth. The common-law approach to justification applied, but the issue here was binary. On the evidence, the court found positively that no threat to kill had been made.
5. Damages. The court adopted the principles collected in Barron v Vines [2016] EWHC 1226 (QB), including compensation, vindication and injury to feelings. It allowed for the allegation’s gravity, publication to 90 people, grapevine effect, the defendant’s persistence in the truth defence and the need for clear vindication. Properly admitted evidence of the claimant’s related violent conduct could mitigate damages under Pamplin v Express Newspapers Ltd (Note) [1988] 1 WLR 116 and Turner v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 3469. The resulting award was £35,000.