Dr Craig Wright v Peter McCormack

Defamation damages must compensate for actual reputational harm and provide appropriate vindication. In assessing them at trial, the court may consider properly admitted evidence that is rationally relevant to those aims. This includes evidence showing that a relevant aspect of the claimant’s reputation is undeserved.

A public finding that a claimant deliberately lied in the litigation may reduce the vindication required, including to nominal damages, where the dishonesty bears on the same reputational attribute as the libel. This is part of determining the claimant’s entitlement, not a punishment imposed after entitlement has been assessed. The distinct rules on fraudulent exaggeration in personal-injury claims do not prevent that analysis.

Dr Wright sued Mr McCormack for tweets and a YouTube broadcast alleging, in substance, that Dr Wright’s claim to be Satoshi Nakamoto was fraudulent. The respondent admitted publication and defamatory meaning, but did not pursue a defence of truth.

At trial, Chamberlain J held that the publications caused serious harm under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013. He also found that Dr Wright had deliberately advanced a false case that he had been disinvited from academic conferences because of the publications. The judge awarded nominal damages of £1: [2022] EWHC 2068 (QB).

The appeal raised whether those false allegations and evidence could lawfully reduce general compensatory damages for defamation to a nominal sum.

Appeal dismissed. The nominal award of £1 was lawful.

1. Damages for defamation compensate injury to reputation, provide appropriate vindication of the claimant’s good name, and may compensate injury to feelings. Vindication repairs a reputation that has suffered actual damage; it is not a free-standing award for infringement of a right. The assessment is made at trial and must reflect the facts then established.

2. The court may take account of properly admitted evidence that is relevant to the legitimate aims of compensation and vindication. The principle in Pamplin is not that every admissible fact mitigates damages. The evidence must bear rationally on the relevant sector of reputation or on the extent of vindication that is necessary and proportionate.

3. The trial judge was entitled to treat the unchallenged findings that Dr Wright deliberately advanced a false case and gave false evidence as disreputable facts relevant to damages. The libel alleged that he had dishonestly claimed to be Satoshi. His attempt to deceive the court about an essential element of the same claim bore directly on that aspect of his reputation. A public judgment recording those findings could reduce the vindication required, notwithstanding that the findings concerned post-publication conduct.

4. The judge should not have treated moral unconscionability as a free-standing test. However, his conclusion was justified by the proper concepts of compensation, vindication, relevance, necessity and proportionality. The award determined entitlement to damages; it was not a punitive deduction for litigation misconduct after entitlement had been fixed.

5. Ul Haq and Summers, concerning fraudulently exaggerated personal-injury claims, did not govern this issue. Personal-injury damages protect interests unaffected by the claimant’s dishonesty. The appeal was also resolved without deciding the wider scope of Campbell.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Dismissed Dr Wright’s appeal and upheld the nominal award of £1: [2023] EWCA Civ 892.
• High Court of Justice, King’s Bench Division Chamberlain J found serious harm but held that the claimant had deliberately advanced a false serious-harm case. He awarded nominal damages: [2022] EWHC 2068 (QB).