Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd

The Court of Appeal is bound by its own previous decisions and those of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. A larger constitution of the court has no greater authority than an ordinary division.

Three exceptions apply. The court may choose between conflicting decisions of its own. It must decline to follow a decision incompatible with binding House of Lords authority. It may also decline to follow a decision given per incuriam.

Under section 29(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1925, a workman who knowingly accepts payments made as statutory compensation cannot recover common-law damages from the employer. This applies although the workman made no formal claim and did not know of the right to elect between remedies.

The plaintiff workman received payments which the employer made, and he knowingly accepted, as compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1925. The commissioner found that the plaintiff had neither claimed compensation nor knowingly exercised the statutory option between compensation and common-law damages.

The commissioner nevertheless treated the acceptance of compensation as fatal to the damages claim. He considered himself bound by Perkins v Hugh Stevenson & Sons, Ld. [1940] 1 KB 56 and Selwood v Townley Coal & Fireclay Co. [1940] 1 KB 180.

The appeal was heard by six members of the Court of Appeal because it raised a question of general importance: whether the court could decline to follow its own earlier decisions on the ground that they were wrong. The plaintiff also contended that those decisions were inconsistent with Kinneil Cannel & Coking Coal Co. v Sneddon [1931] AC 575.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. The joint judgment of Lord Greene MR, Scott, MacKinnon, Luxmoore, Goddard and du Parcq LJJ upheld the commissioner's decision.

2. The second limb of section 29(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1925 barred the common-law damages claim. A workman who knowingly accepts payments made as statutory compensation is precluded from recovering common-law damages from the employer. A formal compensation claim, a conscious exercise of the statutory option and knowledge of the right to elect are unnecessary.

   Perkins v Hugh Stevenson & Sons, Ld. [1940] 1 KB 56 and Selwood v Townley Coal & Fireclay Co. [1940] 1 KB 180 were followed. Kinneil Cannel & Coking Coal Co. v Sneddon [1931] AC 575 was distinguished because it concerned claims by persons whose common-law remedies could not be defeated by another dependant's choice.

3. The Court of Appeal is bound by its own previous decisions and by decisions of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. This promotes finality and applies even where the court considers the earlier decision wrong. The proper remedy is an appeal to the House of Lords.

   The Court of Appeal is one statutory court. A full court has no greater jurisdiction than a division of three judges and therefore has no wider power to overrule an earlier decision.

4. The court identified three exceptions:

   1. where two decisions of the Court of Appeal conflict, the court must choose which to follow;
   2. where an earlier Court of Appeal decision cannot stand with a binding House of Lords decision, the court must give effect to the House of Lords decision; and
   3. where an earlier decision was given per incuriam, the court is not bound to follow it.

5. A decision made in ignorance of the terms of a statute or a rule having statutory force is an example of a decision given per incuriam. Other cases may exist, but they will be exceptionally rare and must be determined on their special facts. Lancaster Motor Co. (London) v Bremith, Ld. [1941] 1 KB 675 was approved as an illustration.

6. Lord Greene MR added individually that his observations in Perkins, later criticised in Unsworth v Elder Dempster Lines, Ld. [1940] 1 KB 658, were wrong. Those observations were obiter and their rejection did not affect the validity of the decision in Perkins.

1. Court of Appeal: In Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718, the full court of six judges unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld the commissioner's decision.
2. Commissioner: The commissioner held that the plaintiff's knowing acceptance of payments made as compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1925 barred the common-law damages claim. No report citation is stated.