Perrin v Morgan

In construing a will, the court must ascertain the meaning which the testator expressed through the language of the particular instrument, read in its relevant circumstances. The ordinary word money has several natural meanings. It is not subject to a fixed legal meaning or a prior presumption favouring a narrow meaning.

A court should not treat earlier decisions on differently worded wills as a binding dictionary. It must determine which ordinary meaning the testator most probably used. A gift of all a testator’s moneys may therefore include the whole residuary personal estate where the will and surrounding circumstances show that intention.

The testatrix made an unprofessionally drafted will. After a legacy to one sister, it directed that all moneys of which I die possessed be shared among named nephews and nieces. Her estate included substantial investments, but the will made no separate gift of them.

Farwell J and the Court of Appeal construed the gift narrowly under the established rule that money did not include investments unless sufficient contextual indications justified a wider meaning. The Court of Appeal reluctantly affirmed that conclusion: [1942] Ch 345.

The House of Lords considered whether that rule should govern the construction of the will and whether, in any event, the will’s language and circumstances showed that the gift included the testatrix’s residuary personal estate.

Decision

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. All members of the House held that the gift of all moneys of which I die possessed included the testatrix’s whole residuary personal estate. The construction of the will therefore benefited the named nephews and nieces, and Farwell J’s order stood as varied by the House.
2. Majority principle. Viscount Simon L.C., with whom Lord Atkin expressly agreed and whose approach Lord Thankerton also adopted, held that the governing task is to ascertain the testator’s expressed intention from the particular will. Money is an ordinary word with several usual meanings. The court must not begin with a fixed, supposedly legal meaning and require context to displace it. Earlier decisions on differently worded wills do not create such a presumption.
3. Relevant context. Lord Atkin explained that construction is guided by the other provisions of the will and admissible surrounding circumstances, including the testator’s position and relationship with beneficiaries. Lord Thankerton added that ordinary linguistic usage may change over time; any residual preference in a case of final ambiguity cannot be stereotyped permanently.
4. Application. The use of all and the plural moneys, the gift to a large group of close relatives, the substantial investments, and the absence of a separate residuary gift showed that the testatrix intended a comprehensive gift. A construction confined to cash, bank balances and accrued income would not reflect the language of this will.
5. Qualification. Lords Russell of Killowen and Romer agreed in the result but would retain the long-standing prima facie rule, provided that it always yields to sufficient context. They nevertheless agreed that the present will plainly supplied the necessary context and that no hard-and-fast restriction could defeat its proper construction.

• House of Lords: Allowed the appeal and varied Farwell J’s order so that the gift included the whole residuary personal estate.
• Court of Appeal: Reluctantly affirmed the narrow construction required by the previous rule concerning money: [1942] Ch 345.
• Farwell J: Construed the gift narrowly, excluding the investments. No report citation is stated in the judgment.