Henry Tedford v Audrey Clarke & Ors

In construing a will, the court must begin with the words of the instrument, read as a whole and in their proper context. Extrinsic evidence is admissible only to the extent that the will or part of it is meaningless or ambiguous within section 21 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982. Subjective evidence of testamentary intention is inadmissible where the words are difficult but neither meaningless nor ambiguous.

The court may correct a simple misdescription and give effect to a specific gift notwithstanding imperfect drafting. A general reference to the testator’s estate ordinarily covers all disposable property, subject to specific gifts and liabilities. Where a will contains a gift to surviving relatives followed by a substitutionary gift to their children, the proviso may be construed as referring to the relatives generally, so that the children take the deceased relative’s intended share.

Veronica Clarke’s will divided her estate between her late husband’s surviving siblings, her own surviving siblings and the proceeds of an account described as being held by Abbey National Bank. It also contained a proviso directing substitutionary gifts to children where a relative predeceased her.

The claimant, the sole personal representative and a potential beneficiary, brought a Part 8 claim seeking directions on the construction of numerous provisions. The principal issues concerned the meaning of “my estate”, the effect of the reference to an Abbey National account, the meaning of “surviving”, the scope of the proviso, and the admissibility of evidence of the testatrix’s subjective intention.

1. Construction and evidence. The will was to be read as a whole, starting with its own wording and using words in their documentary and factual context. Extrinsic evidence was admissible under section 21 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 only to the extent that the relevant part was meaningless or ambiguous. The will was difficult to construe but was not meaningless. Subjective evidence of intention was therefore inadmissible generally, although evidence concerning the ambiguity in “my saving account” was admissible.
2. Estate and residue. “My estate” in clauses 3(i) and 3(ii) meant the net residuary estate, after payment of debts, legacies, funeral and testamentary expenses and the specific gift in clause 3(iii). The description of clauses 3(i) and 3(ii) as specific legacies was a misdescription and did not alter their character as gifts of shares in residue.
3. Clause 3(iii). The reference to Abbey National Bank was a simple misdescription of Santander. “My saving account” referred to all accounts properly capable of being described as savings accounts, including the two saver accounts and the two ISAs. The ordinary bank account was excluded and its proceeds fell into residue.
4. Survival and substitution. “Surviving” ordinarily referred to persons living at the testatrix’s death. The proviso was not meaningless. “Forementioned relatives” referred to brothers and sisters generally, not only surviving brothers and sisters. A deceased sibling’s intended share therefore passed to that sibling’s children. The proviso qualified each part of clause 3. The gifts were absolute despite the omission of the word “absolutely”.
5. The court reached these conclusions without relying on subjective intention. Alternatively, if that evidence had been admissible, it supported the same construction. The claim was determined accordingly.