Wesley v Chantler & Ors

A personal representative must administer an estate diligently and reasonably. After the executor’s year, continued delay requires proper justification. A will or statutory codicil is construed objectively, by reference to its language, structure, purpose and relevant surrounding circumstances. Where section 21 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 applies, extrinsic evidence, including the testator’s intention, may be considered. For a statutory codicil made by the Court of Protection, the relevant intention is that formed by the court through the best-interests framework. On the proper construction of the codicil in this case, a direction to pay trust income did not confer on the life beneficiary a right to use or enjoy trust property.

The claimant, executrix of the estate of the Eighth Earl Bathurst, sought directions in Part 8 proceedings concerning two issues. First, she sought permission to withhold assent of chattels transferred to the Earl’s Fund until she could inspect and inventory them. Secondly, she sought a declaration that the 2008 statutory codicil entitled her to possess and use property held in the Earl’s Fund during her lifetime.

The Earl’s Fund trustees opposed both aspects. The court considered the personal representative’s duties, the construction of the 1998 Will and 2008 statutory codicil, and the relevance of the Court of Protection’s best-interests decision.

1. Assent issue. The claimant could not withhold assent of the exempt chattels as a bargaining chip for a favourable construction of the codicil. Her reasons for seeking a reasonable opportunity to establish an accurate inventory of the non-exempt chattels were otherwise reasonable. She could execute a qualified assent for chattels listed by Christie’s, and other known chattels, provided the trustees gave a suitable exoneration from liability for items not located at Cirencester Park or damaged. An unqualified assent could reasonably be withheld until a practical method of obtaining a comprehensive inventory was available.
2. A personal representative is required to administer the estate diligently, timeously and reasonably. The one-year period under Administration of Estates Act 1925 s 44 is a minimum protected period, and longer may be justified by the circumstances. Here, the claimant had no good reason to withhold assent of the exempt chattels.
3. Construction issue. The phrase directing the trustees to pay the income of the Earl’s Fund to the claimant during her life was ambiguous and could bear the claimant’s proposed meaning. The court therefore considered the document’s language, structure, purpose, context, practical consequences and the extrinsic evidence permitted by Administration of Justice Act 1982 s 21.
4. Because the codicil was made by the Court of Protection for a person lacking capacity, the relevant testamentary intention was the intention formed by the court when applying the best-interests requirements of Mental Capacity Act 2005. The court was entitled to consider the reasoning and expressed intentions underlying the Court of Protection’s orders.
5. The most probable meaning of the codicil was that the trustees were to preserve and manage the capital and pay its income to the claimant. It did not entitle her to possession or use of any property comprised in the Earl’s Fund. The direction sought on the assent issue was declined, and the defendants’ construction prevailed. The judgment did not determine the separate validity of the Chattels Agreement.

This was a first-instance decision of the High Court. The judgment records earlier Court of Protection orders concerning the statutory codicil, but no appeal from a lower court decision was determined.