Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd

A workman who knows that a statutory compensation remedy and an independent damages remedy are available, but deliberately continues to receive statutory compensation, exercises the statutory option and becomes bound to that remedy.

The remedies are alternatives and cannot be pursued to double recovery. Payments received before an effective choice may be deducted from damages. By a majority, mere acceptance of compensation while unaware of the alternative remedy does not by itself bar an independent claim.

The appellant employee suffered an industrial accident and received weekly compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1925. He initially did not know that section 29(1) allowed an alternative common-law claim. After learning of that possibility, he continued accepting compensation for several months and later sued his employer for negligence and breach of statutory duty.

The commissioner dismissed the action as barred by Court of Appeal authority. A specially constituted Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the employee's appeal: [1944] KB 718. The central questions were when a workman irrevocably exercises the statutory option and whether accepting compensation without knowledge of the alternative remedy is sufficient.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously dismissed the appeal. All five Law Lords agreed that the appellant became bound to the statutory remedy because, after learning that an independent claim was available, he continued deliberately to accept weekly compensation.
2. Effective choice. Viscount Simon, Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Porter held that a workman does not lose the independent remedy merely by receiving statutory compensation while unaware that an alternative remedy exists. Knowledge of the available alternatives, followed by conduct manifesting a deliberate choice, is required. On the facts, the appellant possessed the necessary knowledge by July and continued receiving compensation until October.
3. Alternative remedies and double recovery. The speeches agreed that section 29(1) preserved an independent remedy where the statutory conditions were met, while preventing the workman from enforcing both remedies. Viscount Simon, Lord Russell and Lord Porter treated the prohibition against double liability as explanatory of the statutory option. Compensation received before an effective choice could be set off against, or deducted from, damages. The employer would therefore not pay twice.
4. Earlier Court of Appeal decisions. Viscount Simon considered Perkins v Hugh Stevenson & Sons Ltd [1940] 1 KB 56 correct on its facts because the workman knowingly persisted in receiving compensation. Viscount Simon, Lord Russell and Lord Porter rejected the broader proposition, attributed particularly to Selwood v Townley Coal & Fireclay Co Ltd [1940] 1 KB 180, that mere acceptance of compensation as such necessarily barred an independent action despite ignorance of the alternative remedy.
5. Different reasoning. Lord Macmillan and Lord Simonds considered that statutory choice depended principally on what the workman did, rather than on his knowledge or subjective intention. Lord Macmillan regarded knowing acceptance of payments under a genuine compensation agreement as conclusive. Lord Simonds reserved the precise limits of what amounted to claiming compensation. Their approach did not affect the result because the appellant's conduct satisfied every formulation.
6. Court of Appeal precedent. Viscount Simon approved the Court of Appeal's conclusion that one of its divisions, including a specially constituted full court, must follow an earlier Court of Appeal decision covering the point, unless that decision was given per incuriam or the House of Lords had subsequently decided otherwise.

1. House of Lords: Appeal dismissed unanimously; the Court of Appeal's order was affirmed: [1946] AC 163.
2. Court of Appeal: A specially constituted court unanimously dismissed the employee's appeal from the commissioner: [1944] KB 718.
3. Manchester Assizes: Mr Commissioner Laski KC dismissed the common-law action because he considered himself bound by Court of Appeal authority.