Raffaele Mincione v Gedi Gruppo Editoriale SpA

On a strike-out application, the court should not determine disputed factual matters or assess pleaded allegations in isolation. A defence of truth should be struck out only where the court is certain that it is bound to fail, or where no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the pleaded particulars prove the defamatory meaning substantially true.

In a grounds-to-suspect case, a defendant may plead the wider circumstances, including the conduct of alleged co-conspirators, where those circumstances assist in establishing the required grounds of suspicion. The pleading must remain sufficiently clear and particularised, but the court should allow appropriate latitude at the pleading stage. The burden of proving the defence remains on the defendant.

The claimant brought a libel claim concerning six online publications alleging that he was involved in the corrupt or criminal misappropriation of Vatican assets and related conspiracies. The defendant pleaded the statutory defence of truth under section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013, and denied serious harm.

Following a preliminary-issues judgment determining the meanings of the publications, the claimant applied to strike out substantial parts of the amended defence under CPR r 3.4(2)(a), (b) and (c). He argued that the defence was incapable of proving substantial truth, insufficiently particularised, abusive, irrelevant and impermissibly speculative. The central issue was whether the pleaded particulars were capable of establishing the relevant grounds to suspect and the substantial truth of the defamatory imputations.

1. Application refused. The claimant had not established that the defence of truth was incapable of succeeding, abusive, or in breach of the applicable pleading requirements.
2. For CPR r 3.4(2)(a), the court must be certain that the defence is bound to fail before striking it out. The question is whether the particulars are capable of proving the substantial truth of the defamatory imputations and whether a reasonable fact-finder could reach that conclusion.
3. The requirement of substantial truth does not require proof of every detail of the publication. The court must focus on the essential core of the libel and avoid being distracted by inaccuracies that do not affect its sting.
4. Whether the claimant exercised close control over the relevant corporate entities, and whether the pleaded facts established his personal involvement, knowledge or approval, were matters for determination at trial. The court should not isolate individual allegations and assess them without regard to the defence as a whole or the natural inferences arising from the pleaded facts.
5. In pleading a suspected conspiracy, it was proper to plead the full circumstances, including the conduct of other alleged conspirators. Those matters could assist the court in assessing whether there were grounds of the requisite strength to suspect the claimant’s involvement. Appropriate latitude should be allowed at the pleading stage, particularly in a conspiracy case.
6. The pleading did not reverse the burden of proof. The defendant remained required to prove, on the evidence, the strong or very strong grounds to suspect the claimant’s alleged criminal activities and conspiracy. The claimant would not have to disprove the defence.
7. The defence was therefore sufficiently particularised, disclosed reasonable grounds for defending the claim, and did not constitute an abuse of process or obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings. The application was refused.

Not stated in the judgment.