Denver Dorsetra Adams v Amazon Digital UK Ltd

On an application for summary judgment, the court may decide a short point of law or construction where the evidence is sufficient and the claim has no realistic prospect of success. In a defamation claim, substantial truth concerns the essential defamatory sting, not every peripheral detail. The claimant’s reasons for sending abusive messages were irrelevant where the messages themselves carried the sting. Honest opinion does not require proof of the truth of every fact underlying the opinion; the relevant question was whether the defendant knew or ought to have known that the author did not hold it. A misuse of private information claim fails at stage one where the information has become public and no reasonable expectation of privacy remains. Any residual privacy rights must then be balanced proportionately against freedom of expression, including a person’s right to tell their own story.

The claimant, the mother of boxer Nicola Adams, brought libel and misuse of private information claims against Amazon Digital UK Ltd concerning the documentary Lioness: The Nicola Adams Story. The libel claim concerned statements that the claimant had sent abusive and threatening messages and that this perpetuated earlier abuse and damaged the mother-daughter relationship. The privacy claim concerned information about Nicola’s upbringing, domestic violence in the family home and the later messages and relationship breakdown.

The defendant applied for summary judgment, relying on the defences of truth and honest opinion and contending that the information was not private or that publication was justified by freedom of expression and Nicola’s right to tell her own story.

1. Summary judgment. Applying the principles in Easyair Ltd v Opal [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch), the court considered whether each claim had a realistic rather than fanciful prospect of success. The extensive evidence and narrow issues made it unlikely that significant further evidence would emerge. The court was therefore entitled to decide the issues without a trial.
2. Truth. Under section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013, the relevant question was whether the essential defamatory sting was substantially true. The sting was that the claimant had sent abusive messages. That fact was accepted. The reasons for sending the messages and the cause of the family breakdown did not substantially affect the claimant’s reputation and were irrelevant to the defence. The defence of truth therefore succeeded.
3. Honest opinion. The defendant did not have to prove the full factual basis of Nicola’s opinion that the messages were abuse in another form. The claimant had to show that the defendant knew or ought to have known that Nicola did not hold the opinion, under section 3(5) of the Defamation Act 2013. The evidence, including the claimant’s own evidence, provided ample support for Nicola honestly holding that opinion. The challenge to the level of childhood violence did not create a realistic prospect of defeating the defence.
4. Misuse of private information. At stage one, applying the Murray factors, the information about Nicola’s childhood and domestic violence had already been widely publicised through her autobiography and press interviews. The general references to abusive messages and the relationship breakdown likewise disclosed no detailed new information. The claimant therefore had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the material. At stage two, any residual Article 8 rights were outweighed by the Article 10 rights of the defendant and Nicola’s Article 8 and 10 right to tell her own story. The public interest in Nicola’s story added weight to publication, but freedom of expression was not dependent on proving a specific public interest in every expression.
5. Summary judgment was granted for the defendant on both claims. The claimant was ordered to pay the defendant’s costs in the application and the action, to be assessed.