James Palmer v PC Colin Farmer & Ors.

Serious harm under section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 depends on the actual or likely impact of publication, assessed in context. The inherent tendency of defamatory words, however serious, is insufficient by itself. Limited internal circulation, an absence of adverse consequences and a lack of evidence of reputational impact may defeat a claim summarily.

The Jameel abuse jurisdiction remains available where litigation would involve disproportionate costs for no real or substantial benefit. A misuse of private information claim must satisfy both the privacy and seriousness thresholds. Minimal internal retention or circulation, without tangible impact, may neither engage Article 8 nor amount to actionable misuse.

The claimant brought libel and misuse of private information claims against a housing management organisation and a local authority. The claims concerned an unsolicited police email, forwarded internally, which falsely stated that the claimant had been convicted of a sexual offence.

The originating police officer and the Metropolitan Police Service settled, apologised and paid substantial compensation. The remaining defendants applied for summary judgment or strike-out under CPR Parts 24 and 3.4, relying also on the Jameel abuse jurisdiction. The claimant sought permission to amend his pleadings. The central issues were whether the proposed claims had a real prospect of satisfying the serious-harm requirement, whether the publications constituted misuse of private information, and whether continuation of the claims would be abusive.

1. The applications succeeded. The claimant was refused permission to amend the libel and misuse of private information claims. Those claims were struck out or dismissed summarily. The remaining data protection claims were to be transferred to the County Court.
2. Under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, serious harm is assessed as a factual matter by considering the inherent tendency of the words together with their actual impact, or likely impact, on the publishees. The court must consider the context and circumstances of publication. The serious nature of an allegation does not, without evidence of impact, establish serious harm.
3. The pleaded case relied principally on the words’ inherent tendency and speculative possibilities of adverse treatment or further dissemination. The emails had been circulated only internally, the recipient outside the housing organisation had cautioned against the inclusion of the police email, and the evidence disclosed no adverse effect on the claimant. The proposed case therefore had no real prospect of satisfying section 1 and disclosed no reasonable grounds.
4. The Jameel jurisdiction was also made out. The circulation was limited, the defendants had not endorsed the allegation, the emails had been deleted, the claimant had obtained vindication and substantial compensation from the originator, and any damages against the remaining defendants would be minimal compared with the costs of the High Court proceedings. The claim did not involve a real or substantial wrong for which litigation would yield a proportionate benefit. Section 12 of the Defamation Act 1952 permitted the compensation from the MPS to be taken into account in mitigation.
5. Misuse of private information involves a two-stage inquiry: whether the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that interest was outweighed by countervailing interests. The claim must also plead the private information, the basis for the expectation of privacy, the alleged misuse, the competing rights, and detriment and relief. The defendants’ limited internal retention and circulation did not arguably reach the required threshold of seriousness or cause actionable detriment. The MPI claims therefore had no realistic prospect of success and were also abusive under Jameel.

First instance decision. The judgment records no prior judicial decision in the same proceedings.