Barron MP & Anor v Vines (Rev 1)

In defamation proceedings, meaning is determined objectively by the understanding of the ordinary reasonable reader or viewer. The publisher’s intention is irrelevant. Words are defamatory where they substantially adversely affect, or tend to affect, reputation and publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm under the Defamation Act 2013. Truth is not an element of the claimant’s case; it is a defence that must be specifically pleaded and proved by the defendant. Summary judgment may be granted where there is no real prospect of a successful defence, but the court should proceed cautiously in political speech cases and where a novel public-interest defence may arguably arise. Procedural fairness may justify a final opportunity to amend a defence before judgment.

The claimants, two Labour MPs, brought proceedings in slander and libel against the defendant, a UKIP councillor, over comments made during a televised discussion of child sexual exploitation in Rotherham. The defendant admitted publication of defamatory words and their disparaging effect on the claimants as MPs, but his Defence disputed meaning, referred inadequately to justification, and apologised for part of the allegation.

The claimants applied to strike out the Defence or obtain summary judgment under CPR 24. The court considered the meaning of the broadcast, whether any pleaded or unpleaded defence of truth, honest opinion or publication on a matter of public interest could succeed, and whether fairness required the defendant to have a further opportunity to obtain advice.

1. The Defence was incoherent, disclosed no reasonable basis for defending the claim and failed to comply with the Part 53 Practice Direction. The admissions alone entitled the claimants to judgment in the absence of a substantive defence.
2. Applying Jeynes v News Magazines Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 130, the ordinary reasonable viewer would have understood the broadcast to allege that the claimants had known for years of large-scale child sexual abuse, had allowed it to continue, had let down the children and were still failing to ensure that perpetrators were brought to justice. The words were defamatory. The defendant’s intended limitation of the allegation to 2012 was untenable.
3. The first principal imputation was factual and could not realistically be defended as substantially true on the facts advanced. The criticism of the second claimant’s response to a proposed inquiry and of the first claimant’s earlier conduct might be relevant to mitigation under Burstein v Times Newspapers Limited [2001] 1 WLR 579, but could not establish truth of the defamatory meaning.
4. The defendant had withdrawn and apologised for the allegation of current failure to act. No factual basis had been shown for defending that allegation. The uncomplained-of opinion that the claimants had let down the children required no answer.
5. The possibility of a defence under section 4 of the Defamation Act 2013 required further consideration. The public-interest subject matter requirement was plainly satisfied, but the evidence concerning the defendant’s belief and the meaning of “statement complained of” was incomplete. The court’s observations on that novel issue were tentative.
6. Although summary judgment would otherwise have been granted, fairness and proportionality under CPR 1.1(2) justified a final opportunity for the unrepresented defendant to obtain advice and submit an amended Defence and evidence confined to section 4. He declined that opportunity and accepted the judgment. Judgment was entered for damages to be assessed, with costs summarily assessed at £15,000 inclusive of VAT.

Not an appeal. The High Court determined the claimants’ applications and, after the defendant declined the opportunity to amend and accepted the judgment, entered judgment for damages to be assessed.