Price v MGN Ltd

In determining meaning, the court must consider the publication as a whole, including its headlines, context, readership and known circumstances. Separate narrative strands may combine to convey a defamatory imputation, even where responsibility is expressed by reference to an organisation rather than an individual.

A claimant may choose which distinct defamatory imputations to pursue. Uncomplained-of imputations cannot ordinarily defeat the claim by proving their truth or by establishing bad reputation through other publications. A serious defamatory imputation ordinarily supports an inference of serious reputational harm. Summary judgment is appropriate only where the claim has no realistic prospect of success, and a trial should proceed where factual investigation or proportionate assessment remains necessary.

The claimant, formerly Chief Constable of Cleveland Police, brought a libel claim against the publisher of the Mirror concerning three articles published in December 2016. He alleged that the articles conveyed that, while Chief Constable, he participated in the unlawful interception of a Mirror journalist’s mobile telephone records.

The defendant denied that meaning and sought summary judgment or strike-out. It argued that the articles also contained separate allegations concerning the claimant’s dismissal and existing reputation, and that those matters meant the interception allegations could not have caused serious harm or that proceeding would be abusive.

The court therefore had to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the articles and whether the claim had no realistic prospect of success or constituted an abuse of process.

1. Meaning. The court found that each article conveyed an Interception Meaning. Meaning is assessed objectively by reference to the words, the publication as a whole, the readership, context and known circumstances. Evidence of what readers actually understood is irrelevant at this stage. The First and Second Articles connected the claimant’s misconduct with the unlawful interception by their language, structure, photographs and implied causation. The Third Article was still clearer: its headline and opening paragraph identified the claimant as the person at the centre of the interception scandal.
2. The defendant’s attempt to separate the articles’ strands was unrealistic. The ordinary reader would understand that the interception was prompted by the Mirror’s investigation into the claimant and that he was implicated. The articles did not merely convey reasonable grounds for suspicion.
3. Choice of imputations and truth. A claimant may select which distinct defamatory imputations to pursue. The defendant could not defend the Interception Meanings by proving the truth of separate Dismissal Allegations. Section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013 did not alter that principle. Section 2(3) presupposed that the defence of truth was made out in relation to at least one complained-of imputation.
4. Serious harm and reputation. A serious defamatory imputation ordinarily permits an inference of serious reputational harm. Existing bad reputation must concern the relevant sector of reputation and cannot ordinarily be proved through specific misconduct or other damaging publications. The Goody exception for criminal convictions did not extend, on the material before the court, to disciplinary findings.
5. Summary judgment and abuse. Under CPR 24.2, judgment could be entered only if the claim had no realistic prospect of success and there was no compelling reason for trial. The defendant’s factual case was inadequately formulated, and the court could not conclude that damages would be minimal or that the necessary investigation would be disproportionate. Background matters might be admissible under the Burstein principle, but that did not justify terminating the claim.
6. The separate allegation that the claimant had abused process by choosing not to complain of the Dismissal Allegations had no substantive merit. The applications for summary judgment and striking out were dismissed. The court directed that costs and future case management be addressed separately.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.