James Gordon Miller v Andrew Peake

In a defamation claim arising from repeated Facebook publications, meaning must be assessed by the impression made on the ordinary reasonable reader, taking account of the conversational nature and context of social media. Serious harm may be inferred from the words, publication circumstances, the claimant’s position and likely percolation; it is not merely a numbers exercise. A public-interest defence requires an objective public-interest subject and a defendant’s objectively reasonable belief in publication, assessed in the round. A personal campaign, unsupported allegations, inadequate verification and abusive tone may make that belief unreasonable. Honest opinion fails where the words are bare comment or depend on facts not proved. Reputational damage and injury to feelings are not recoverable in malicious falsehood without actual financial loss.

The claimant, a parish council clerk, sued a former parish councillor over twelve Facebook posts alleging dishonesty, incompetence, threats, misconduct and other matters. The claim was brought in defamation and malicious falsehood. Publication and reference were established, and the defendant relied on truth, honest opinion and publication on a matter of public interest.

The court determined the meanings of the posts, whether they were defamatory and caused serious harm, whether the statutory defences succeeded, and the consequences for the malicious falsehood claim and damages.

1. Defamation. The posts conveyed meanings that the claimant was dishonest, incompetent, threatening, or otherwise seriously blameworthy. Those meanings were defamatory at common law because they tended to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking people and would have a substantially adverse effect on how others treated him.
2. Meaning and serious harm. Meaning was assessed by the ordinary reasonable reader, with an impressionistic approach appropriate to Facebook. The claimant proved serious harm under Defamation Act 2013, s 1. The allegations were grave, repeated over nine months, published to hundreds directly and likely to a wider local audience through percolation. Each publication was sufficiently serious individually, although aggregation might in an appropriate case be permissible.
3. Truth. The defendant failed to prove the pleaded imputations substantially true under s 2. Individual mistakes, an honestly held belief about missing documents, an error concerning training, and a misconceived approach to VAT did not establish dishonesty, threats or general incompetence.
4. Honest opinion. Under s 3, many statements were allegations of fact or bare comment. The defence failed because the publications did not adequately indicate the factual basis of opinion, or depended on allegations that had not been proved.
5. Public interest. Conduct and suitability of a parish clerk could be a matter of public interest. However, applying s 4 in the round, the defendant’s belief was unreasonable. The posts were substantially personal attacks, included irrelevant and unsupported allegations, lacked adequate verification, and were often abusive. Amateur or citizen publication attracted no special leeway.
6. Malicious falsehood and remedy. The malicious falsehood claim was dismissed. No actual financial loss was pleaded or proved, so damages for injury to feelings or reputation were unavailable. The defamation claim succeeded. The claimant was awarded global damages of £20,000, including a modest element reflecting aggravation. The parties were invited to agree the form of any injunction or undertaking.