Meade v Pugh & Anor

Communications made in the performance of an existing duty, such as an educational placement report, attract qualified privilege. The privilege is defeated only if the claimant can show that the defendant did not honestly believe the publication to be true, or that an improper motive was dominant. Personal spite or a desire to injure is insufficient without proof of dominance, dishonesty, or reckless indifference to truth. On an application in a libel claim carrying a right to jury trial, the court assumes the pleaded facts in the claimant’s favour and asks whether a properly directed jury could find malice. If it could not, the issue should be withdrawn and summary judgment entered.

The claimant, a social-work student, sued the manager and assistant manager of his placement centre over two feedback reports prepared for his college placement assessment. The defendants appealed against the Master’s refusal to strike out the claim or grant summary judgment, and against permission to add a later report. The claimant alleged that the reports were defamatory and published maliciously. The central issue was whether the pleaded evidence could support a finding that qualified privilege had been defeated by malice.

1. Qualified privilege. The reports were published on an occasion of qualified privilege because the defendants and the college practice teacher were acting under corresponding duties. The possible public availability of the reports did not alter that conclusion. The extended privilege in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 2002 was unnecessary.
2. Malice. Applying Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135, the claimant had to show either that the defendants did not believe the words to be true, or that personal spite or a desire to injure was their dominant motive. A positive belief in truth is presumed unless disproved. Recklessness or indifference to truth may defeat the privilege, but carelessness, irrationality or imperfect reasoning does not necessarily do so. A spiteful gift, even if proved, did not logically establish dishonesty in the reports.
3. Jury-trial threshold. The court applied the approach in R v Gailbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039, as reaffirmed in Alexander v Arts Council of Wales [2001] 1 WLR 1840. The question was whether a properly directed and conscientious jury could find malice on the assumed facts. The answer was no. The evidence did not make dishonesty or a dominant improper motive more likely than honest belief.
4. The Master therefore erred in law. The appeal was allowed, permission to rely on the later document and additional material was refused, and summary judgment was entered for the defendants. The court did not determine the separate meaning issue.

The judgment records an appeal from the Master’s decision refusing to strike out the claim or grant summary judgment, and permitting reliance on an additional report. The appeal was allowed and summary judgment was entered for the defendants.