Alsaifi v Trinity Mirror Plc & Ors

[2017] EWHC 1444 (QB)

Case details

Case citations
[2017] EWHC 1444 (QB)
Court
High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Judgment date
27 June 2017
Judgment text

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Subjects
Tort Defamation Qualified privilege
Keywords
libel meaning natural and ordinary meaning reporting privilege fair and accurate report malice honest opinion summary judgment Jameel abuse
Outcome
summary judgment for trinity mirror; claim against newcastle college not finally determined
Judicial consideration

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Summary

In a defamation claim, the court must assess the words in their full publication context, rather than isolated words selected by the claimant. At the meaning stage, the court identifies the range of meanings reasonably capable of being conveyed and rejects strained or extravagant alternatives.

A fair and accurate extract or summary of a public authority's notice may attract qualified privilege under the Defamation Act 1996, even if it is selective and contains minor inaccuracies. Later events do not retrospectively alter whether the original report was fair and accurate, although they may bear on public benefit or malice. A claim may be summarily dismissed where privilege and honest opinion defences are bound to succeed, or where any residual claim would be abusive under the Jameel v Dow Jones principle.

Factual background

The claimant brought libel claims against Trinity Mirror and Newcastle College concerning an article reporting disciplinary findings against him and statements attributed to the College's principal. He applied for rulings that the words were capable of bearing his pleaded defamatory meanings. Trinity Mirror applied for summary judgment, relying principally on statutory reporting privilege, honest opinion and abuse of process.

The article reported a decision notice issued by the National College for Teaching and Leadership and a prohibition order later quashed on jurisdictional grounds in Alsaifi v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 1519 (Admin). A later article reported that outcome and was linked from the original article. The central issues were the meanings reasonably capable of being conveyed, the scope of reporting privilege, malice, honest opinion and whether any remaining claim should proceed.

Held

  1. Meaning. The pleaded meanings were excessively long, often used technical or non-idiomatic language, and frequently represented strained interpretations. The court had to read the article as a whole and apply the reasonable-reader principles in Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 130. The First Article was nevertheless capable of conveying that the claimant, while teaching a 17-year-old girl, had behaved inappropriately by making sexual advances, including touching her hand, inviting her to lunch and sending personal emails containing kisses; that his conduct was sexually motivated; and that prohibition from teaching was appropriate.
  2. The words attributed to Newcastle College were also capable, in context, of conveying that the claimant had engaged in the conduct found proved by the NCTL and that suspension, dismissal and prohibition were justified. The pleaded innuendo meanings were misconceived because the extraneous facts were not true innuendo facts.
  3. Reporting privilege. Sections 15 and Schedule 1 paragraphs 9 and 11 of the Defamation Act 1996 protected the article's account of the NCTL decision notice. The notice was issued for public information by an authority performing governmental functions. The relevant passages were a fair and accurate extract or summary. A report need not be verbatim or accurate in every detail; it may be selective, and minor inaccuracies or reasonable glosses do not necessarily defeat privilege.
  4. The later quashing of the prohibition order did not retrospectively prevent the original article from being a fair and accurate report. The later article and hyperlink supplied a fair presentation of the overall position. There was no tenable case of malice. Malice requires a dominant improper motive and must be pleaded with particularity.
  5. Honest opinion and abuse. The statements attributed to the College principal were opinions, indicated their factual basis and could honestly have been held on the basis of the privileged report. The conditions in section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013 were satisfied. Any residual claim concerning the statement about the College's actions was too trivial and disproportionate to pursue and was dismissed as an abuse under Jameel v Dow Jones [2005] 1 QB 946.
  6. Summary judgment was therefore entered for Trinity Mirror. The claim against Newcastle College was not finally determined by this judgment.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Key cases cited

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