Dee v Telegraph Media Group Ltd.

Newspaper items concerning the same subject must be read together when their content, presentation and cross-references make them sufficiently closely connected to constitute a single publication. The court may determine that question on a summary judgment application.

An allegation of poor sporting performance may be defamatory where it conveys professional incompetence or exposes the person to ridicule. Mere relative lack of sporting skill does not necessarily damage reputation.

Summary judgment on justification is appropriate where no rational jury could find that the defamatory sting was not substantially true. The court must consider every defamatory meaning the publication is capable of bearing, while disregarding matters outside the pleaded complaint.

A professional tennis player brought a libel claim concerning a front-page article headed “World’s worst tennis pro wins at last”. The article reported that he had ended a run of 54 defeats. It expressly directed readers to a longer article in the newspaper’s sports supplement, which explained that the defeats occurred on the international circuit and that the claimant also played on the Spanish national tour.

The publisher applied for summary judgment under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. The principal issues were whether the two articles had to be read together, whether they were arguably defamatory, and whether the defences of justification or fair comment were bound to succeed.

1. Application granted; summary judgment for the defendant. The front-page item and sports-supplement article had to be read together. The governing question was whether the items were sufficiently closely connected to constitute a single publication. The clear cross-reference to the “full story”, the common subject matter and the limited nature of the front-page item made the contrary conclusion unarguable. The court could determine this issue under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998: [1995] 2 AC 65 applied.

2. The combined publication was capable of being defamatory if understood to allege want of skill or incompetence, or to expose the claimant to ridicule by portraying him as absurdly bad at tennis. Relative lack of sporting skill does not invariably damage reputation. Losing is inherent in competitive sport and may reflect misfortune, inexperience or comparative ability rather than professional incompetence. Nevertheless, the authorities concerning professional reputation and ridicule meant that the issue was arguable.

3. A claimant must plead with sufficient clarity the imputations said to make the words defamatory. The existing meaning did not clearly allege want of skill, incompetence or ridicule. Had the claim continued, the claimant would have been required to reformulate it so that the defendant knew the case it had to meet.

4. On an application asserting that justification is bound to succeed, the defendant must establish that a jury would be perverse to reach any conclusion other than substantial truth. The court must assess rather than try the case, but must reject conclusions lacking any realistic foundation. Where meaning is disputed, it must consider whether justification succeeds against every defamatory meaning the words are capable of bearing, subject to excluding discrete matters outside the complaint or plea.

5. The ordinary sensible reader could not understand the 54 defeats as the claimant’s entire professional record. The longer article distinguished the international circuit from the Spanish national tour, referred to prize money and conveyed some success in Spain. Nor was “world’s worst” an independent, objectively verifiable assertion. It was parasitic upon the world-record-equalling run of defeats on the international professional circuit.

6. The undisputed or incontestable facts established the material sting. The claimant had lost 54 consecutive international-circuit matches in straight sets, equalling the worst recorded run, while his Spanish matches were outside that circuit. No rational jury could conclude that justification failed. It was unnecessary to decide fair comment.

At an interlocutory hearing on 8 October 2009, Eady J ordered the claimant to clarify his case concerning the meanings of “circuit”, “world circuit” and “international professional circuit”.

In the present first-instance judgment, the High Court granted the defendant summary judgment under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.