Ali v Associated Newspapers Ltd

Summary judgment in a libel claim should be granted only where a properly directed jury could not rationally decide the issue for the claimant. The judge must allow for the jury’s role in assessing facts, credibility and inferences, and should not conduct a mini-trial. That restraint applies even where the defendant relies on apparently undisputed written material. It does not prevent summary judgment where the publication’s meaning is clear in its overall context and any contrary interpretation would be perverse. The court may then conclude that the claim is bound to fail and that there is an absence of reality in pursuing it. Evidence about other publications or the claimant’s background cannot qualify the plain meaning of the publication where it cannot affect the result.

The claimant, a civil servant, brought libel proceedings concerning articles published in the Mail on Sunday, the Daily Mail and on the defendant’s website. The articles alleged that he was a hardline Islamic extremist who supported the killing of British and American soldiers in Iraq as justified.

The defendant applied for summary judgment under CPR Part 24 and, alternatively, to strike out the claim under CPR Part 3.4(2). It argued that the claimant’s blog, read as a whole, necessarily conveyed the pleaded meaning and justified the allegation. The central issue was whether a jury could rationally reach a different conclusion on the meaning of the blog and the inference to be drawn from it.

1. Application granted. Summary judgment was entered for the defendant. The claim was bound to fail.
2. On an application of this kind in a libel action, the court must respect the claimant’s right to have a jury determine issues of fact and inference. The judge should assume pleaded facts in the claimant’s favour, avoid assessing witness credibility where cross-examination may matter, and refrain from conducting a mini-trial. The relevant question is whether a properly directed jury could reach the claimant’s conclusion without being perverse, applying the principles identified in Alexander v Arts Council of Wales [2001] 1 WLR 1840 and Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe [2003] EWCA Civ 1694 at [14].
3. The same approach applies to the meaning of the publication and to the inference that the publication itself establishes the pleaded defamatory meaning. The court must consider the document in its overall context, while recognising that the jury may draw inferences from the primary facts.
4. On the unusual facts, the blog’s language and context conveyed that the claimant regarded the killing of British and American troops in Iraq as justified by his interpretation of jihad. The suggested distinction between the position before and after the 2005 Iraqi elections was not expressed in the blog and could not rationally be imposed on it.
5. The meaning was therefore plain. It would be perverse for a jury to adopt the contrary interpretation. Investigation of the claimant’s other blogs, background and later evidence could not alter or qualify that meaning. The defendant’s application accordingly succeeded.