Smart Shirts Limited v Sheffield Hallam University

In determining meaning in a defamation claim, the court must identify the single natural and ordinary meaning conveyed by the publication as a whole to the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader. For online material, whether linked content forms part of the publication depends on context and whether it is sufficiently closely connected with the principal publication. The assessment is impressionistic rather than an intensive parsing exercise. A court should avoid attributing the worst possible meaning where the publication supports only grounds for investigation or suspicion. Allegations of culpability, knowledge and concealment must be identified distinctly. A publication may convey a historical allegation rather than a continuing one where its overall presentation looks back at past events.

This was a retrial of preliminary issues concerning the meaning and defamatory character of an email and report published by the Defendant about forced labour in apparel supply chains. The Court of Appeal had ordered the retrial by consent on 1 April 2025 after setting aside the earlier determination in [2024] EWHC 3276 (KB).

The Claimant alleged that both publications accused it of knowingly and wrongfully sourcing products made with forced labour in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and that the report additionally alleged complicity and deliberate concealment. The Defendant advanced meanings based on grounds for investigation or suspicion and disputed that its primary meaning for the report was defamatory. The central issues were the proper scope of the report, its natural and ordinary meaning, the applicable Chase level, and whether the meanings were defamatory.

1. Scope of the Report. The Report had to be read as a whole. Annex A was listed in the Table of Contents and referred to in the body, but access required a reader to follow a link, scroll through the website and follow a further link. In the circumstances, that process was too involved and convoluted for Annex A to form part of the single publication. It was excluded from the assessment of meaning. That conclusion did not determine the parameters of the Defendant’s public-interest defence under s.4 of the Defamation Act 2013.
2. The governing approach. The court applied the objective approach in Koutsogiannis. The hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader reads the publication as a whole, but does not analyse it like a lawyer or accountant. The court must capture the overall impression and avoid intense parsing of a lengthy publication.
3. The E-Mail. Its natural and ordinary meaning was that there were grounds to investigate whether the Claimant knew or should have known that it was sourcing raw materials or supplies produced by forced labour from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The E-Mail did not allege actual knowledge or that the Claimant should have known as a concluded fact.
4. The Report. Its natural and ordinary meaning was that the Claimant was a key part of a supply chain and that there were grounds to investigate whether it knew or should have known that the materials were products of forced labour from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The allegation focused primarily on Sunrise. The Report did not accuse the Claimant of deliberate concealment or complicity in genocidal policies. Those matters would have required a forced or contingent reading at Chase level 3.
5. Temporal quality and defamation. The meanings were properly expressed in the past tense. The publications principally looked back at what had happened, rather than conveying a continuing allegation. Both meanings were defamatory of the Claimant at common law. The preliminary issues were determined accordingly.

1. Court of Appeal. On 1 April 2025, the appeal from the first determination of meaning was disposed of by consent. The determination was set aside and a retrial was ordered.
2. High Court (King’s Bench Division). The retrial was conducted by Mr Justice Nicklin, who determined the natural and ordinary meanings and held that both meanings were defamatory at common law.