Isaac Ameyaw v Penny Anthony

Natural and ordinary meaning is assessed from the publication as a whole and through the hypothetical reasonable reader. A request to investigate does not reduce categorical allegations to grounds for inquiry where the publication presents wrongdoing as established and calls for accountability. A court should not add dishonesty to a meaning unless it necessarily follows from the words; conduct described as unethical, coercive or poor performance does not, without more, convey dishonesty. Under the Defamation Act 2013, indicating the basis of a statement does not remove the separate threshold that it be an opinion. Whether words are fact or opinion depends on the ordinary reader, the words and their context. Verifiability points towards fact but is not decisive.

This was a first-instance trial of preliminary issues in Isaac Ameyaw v Penny Anthony, a defamation action. The defendant had emailed church and Baptist Union recipients alleging that the claimant, a church youth minister, spent most of his contracted hours on private filming, neglected his duties and threatened legal action when challenged. The preliminary issues were the words’ natural and ordinary meaning, whether that meaning was defamatory, and which statements were fact or opinion. It was common ground that any opinion had an indicated basis.

1. Preliminary issues determined. The ordinary and natural meaning was at Chase level 1: the email alleged that the claimant had engaged in the stated conduct, rather than that there were merely grounds to investigate it. Read as a whole, the email asserted wrongdoing as fact and called for accountability. Its final request to investigate did not qualify those assertions. The court applied the principles in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB) and used the Chase levels as a helpful shorthand, not a rigid classification.
2. The meaning included unethical and self-serving conduct: the claimant was present on church premises for only a few hours each week, spent most contracted hours on undeclared private filming to the youth’s detriment, coerced the former Lead Minister into buying expensive media equipment, carried out very little of his job-description duties, and threatened legal action when he did not get his own way. It did not include dishonesty or accusations of racism. Dishonesty was not in the email and did not necessarily follow from the conduct alleged. A court should not add such a loaded term unless it necessarily follows from the original wording.
3. The meaning was defamatory at common law, as the parties agreed. Applying the fact-or-opinion principles, the court held that the assertions about filming, equipment, job performance and threats were statements of fact. The assertion of self-serving conduct was also factual because it attributed a motive. By contrast, describing conduct as unethical was opinion: it was a subjective assessment, and the email gave readers its basis.
4. The indication of a basis for opinion did not itself make a statement an opinion. Under sections 3(2) and 3(3) of the Defamation Act 2013, opinion status remained a threshold requirement distinct from indicating the opinion’s basis. The basis of the opinion was indicated.

This was a first-instance trial of preliminary issues ordered by Steyn J. No earlier judgment or appellate decision is stated.