Morgan v Associated Newspapers Ltd

In a defamation claim, natural and ordinary meaning is assessed objectively by asking what the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader would understand from the publication as a whole. Only the words complained of are admissible on meaning. Fact and opinion are distinguished by how the words would strike that reader, having regard to context and whether criticism is recognisable as comment. Lawful underlying conduct may be non-defamatory, while clearly attributed condemnation of that conduct may be a defamatory expression of opinion. A bare comment may be treated as fact where it implies unspecified conduct, but that qualification did not arise.

The claimant brought a libel claim against the publisher of a Daily Mail article concerning building-company executives using discounts or other arrangements to acquire properties. By order dated 19 June 2018, the court directed preliminary determination of the article’s meaning and whether any defamatory imputations were allegations of fact or expressions of opinion. The claimant and defendant advanced competing meanings. The central issues were what an ordinary reasonable reader would understand the article to convey about the claimant and whether its defamatory sting was fact or opinion.

1. Meaning. The court applied the established objective approach in Lachaux v Independent Print Limited [2016] QB 402 [15(2)] and Jeynes v News Magazines Limited [2008] EWCA (Civ) 130 [14]. Meaning was assessed from the words complained of alone, consistently with Charleston v News Group [1995] 2 AC 65 [70], and by reading the whole publication in context, as explained in Bukovsky v Crown Prosecution Service [2018] EMLR 5 [14]-[16].
2. The article meant that the claimant had taken advantage of an opportunity to purchase six houses built by his company for affordable-housing purchasers after planning rules had changed; had bought them at a substantial discount of £860,000 against a market value of £2.1 million; and thereby stood to make a very large personal gain. Allegations of secrecy, renting four properties to staff, rubber-stamped dealings and use of a shareholder scheme did not form part of the natural and ordinary meaning against him. The article conveyed that the purchase was lawful and within the claimant’s entitlement.
3. Fact and opinion. Applying the framework drawn from Yeo v Times Newspapers Limited [2015] 1 WLR 971 [88]-[89], including the guidance in Branson v Bower [2001] EMLR 32 and Grech v Odhams Press [1958] 2 QB 75, the factual allegations were not themselves defamatory. The defamatory sting was the criticism that the claimant had exploited his position to line his own pockets in a greedy, unethical and morally unacceptable way. That was an expression of opinion because it was clearly attributed to third parties, was recognisable as criticism, and left readers able to form their own judgment. The bare-comment qualification identified in Yeo v Times Newspapers Limited did not arise.
4. The warning in British Chiropractic Association v Singh [2011] 1 WLR 133 [32] was borne in mind. Minor differences in the online version did not affect the conclusions.
5. Case management. The judge gave obiter guidance that, where meaning is disputed, parties should consider whether the cost of pleading a full defence before a meaning ruling is justified. The overriding objective and active case-management duties under the Civil Procedure Rules, including CPR 1.3 and CPR 1.4(2), favour early determination of meaning. The judgment did not determine the claimant’s further applications.

This was a first-instance preliminary-issues ruling. The claim form was issued on 16 October 2017, particulars of claim were served around 25 October 2017, and the defence was served on 9 March 2018. By order dated 19 June 2018, meaning and fact or opinion were directed for preliminary determination.