Cruddas v Calvert & Ors

In libel, the court must identify the single natural and ordinary meaning which the words convey to the ordinary reasonable reader. That meaning will generally be a dominant meaning near the centre of the range of possible meanings. An appellate court should exercise restraint but must intervene where satisfied that the selected meaning is wrong.

Describing conduct as corrupt does not necessarily impute criminal corruption. A defendant may justify the lesser defamatory meaning which the publication bears. A justification defence concerning a journalistic summary should not be struck out merely because the report contains commentary and does not reproduce every underlying exchange.

Malicious falsehood differs from libel: every reasonably available meaning understood by a substantial number of people may require consideration.

Two undercover journalists met the respondent, a political party treasurer, while posing as representatives of overseas investors. Their newspaper subsequently published articles alleging that he offered access to senior ministers in return for donations and discussed methods by which overseas funds might be channelled to the party.

The respondent brought claims in libel and malicious falsehood. Tugendhat J held in [2013] EWHC 1427 (QB) that the articles' single meaning included criminal corruption and countenancing a breach of electoral law. He struck out the justification defence, entered judgment for damages to be assessed and granted injunctions.

The defendants appealed against the finding of criminal corruption and sought reinstatement of their justification defence. The appeal also concerned the range of meanings reasonably available for the malicious falsehood claim.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The articles' single meaning for libel did not include an allegation of corruption contrary to the criminal law. The orders striking out the relevant defence paragraphs, entering judgment for damages to be assessed and granting injunctions against republication were set aside. Longmore LJ delivered the judgment, with which Rafferty LJ and Sir Stephen Sedley agreed.

2. The natural and ordinary meaning was assessed from the perspective of an ordinary reasonable reader who was neither naïve nor unduly suspicious, could read between the lines, and was not avid for scandal. The articles alleged inappropriate, unacceptable and wrong conduct tending to impropriety. They did not expressly or implicitly allege criminal corruption. Although an appellate court should be slow to disturb a trial judge's conclusion on meaning, it has a duty to do so when satisfied that the conclusion is wrong, especially where the same written material is before both courts.

3. The allegation that money might be channelled through nominal donors was capable of imputing a breach of section 61 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. That offence was substantively different from personal criminal corruption. It was impermissible to infer the latter imputation from the former.

4. The justification defence had to proceed to trial. A defendant may seek to justify the lesser defamatory meaning which the publication actually bears. A journalistic report need not reproduce the totality of an undercover exchange or consist solely of quotations. The relevant question is whether the report as a whole fairly and accurately summarises what was said. The first libel claim therefore required trial, as did the closely connected second and third claims.

5. For malicious falsehood, the court must identify the reasonably available meanings, determine whether a substantial number of people would reasonably understand the words in each such sense, and then decide whether any false and damaging meaning was published maliciously. Criminal corruption remained a reasonably available meaning for that claim, despite not being the single meaning for libel. The imputation of an actual breach of electoral law also remained available; a mere breach of its spirit was not added. Falsity and malice were left for trial.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2013] EWCA Civ 748, unanimously allowed the appeal in part. It declared that the libel meaning did not allege criminal corruption and set aside the strike-out, judgment and injunction orders. Other libel and malicious falsehood issues were left for trial.
2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Tugendhat J in [2013] EWHC 1427 (QB) held that the libel meaning included criminal corruption, struck out the justification defence, entered judgment for damages to be assessed and granted injunctions.