Andre v Price

For honest comment, the words must be comment rather than fact, based on facts which are true or protected by privilege, and represent an opinion which an honest person could hold. The subject matter must also be one of public interest. A public figure’s private relationship with a child does not become a matter of public interest merely because the relationship, or a related song, has been publicised. The court must also balance the competing Convention rights engaged by the defence. In slander concerning a profession or business, Defamation Act 1952, section 2 requires more than a minimal degree of likely reputational disparagement. The words, their context, the publishees and the seriousness of the imputation must all be considered.

The claimant, a singer and television personality, sued the defendant, his estranged wife, in libel over an interview published in Heat magazine and in slander over words allegedly spoken during a recording of The Graham Norton Show. The defendant relied on honest comment in relation to the libel. The claimant challenged parts of the defence and the defendant’s pleaded factual basis and malice. The slander claim raised whether an allegation of adultery with the claimant’s former manager was calculated to disparage him in an office, profession, calling, trade or business under section 2 of the Defamation Act 1952. The court also considered whether the private relationship between the claimant and his stepson was a matter of public interest.

1. Words in the Heat interview. The words complained of could only be understood as an expression of opinion, not a statement of fact. Although calling someone a liar or hypocrite can convey fact, that meaning could not alter the character of words which themselves expressed only an opinion ([23]).
2. The pleaded factual basis was not to be withdrawn from the jury. Truth required more than literal accuracy. A statement could be accurate yet convey a false impression. The jury had to decide whether the claimant chose, or merely agreed, to see H for two nights a fortnight ([54]–[55]).
3. The pleaded matters concerning the defendant’s alleged propensity to say and defend things she did not believe could be relevant to malice. Spite or ill-will alone was not malice in law, but could be evidence from which lack of honest belief was inferred. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the reply were struck out; the other challenged matters were retained ([60]–[68]).
4. Public interest. The relationship between the claimant and H was not a matter of public interest. Public statements, a song and the parties’ celebrity did not change that conclusion. The court recognised that particular facts might make a parent’s relationship with a child a matter of public interest, but found no such facts here ([80]–[81]). The court also balanced the claimant’s and children’s Article 8 rights against the defendant’s Article 10 rights. Article 10 did not outweigh the Article 8 rights, particularly those of H ([82]–[93]). The honest-comment defence therefore could not proceed.
5. The Graham Norton Show slander. Section 2 of the Defamation Act 1952 required a flexible assessment of likelihood and seriousness. “Calculated” meant likely, but less than more likely than not. The allegation’s professional context made section 2 more readily applicable than an allegation of a private affair, yet the limited publication and circumstances did not meet the required threshold of seriousness. The issue could not properly be left to the jury ([97]–[105]).