Case details
Summary
In defamation proceedings, a court may extend the ordinary limitation period only where it is equitable to do so, having regard to the statutory factors and the prejudice on both sides. Delay after the claimant learns the material facts, without adequate explanation, may justify refusal.
Slander may be actionable without proof of special damage where the words impute an imprisonable criminal offence or are likely to disparage the claimant in his profession. A person is a co-publisher of a later broadcast only where the evidence establishes intention or authorisation; reasonable foreseeability alone does not establish that liability on the pleaded case. Truth is a complete defence to libel and slander.
Factual background
The claimant, an entertainer, sued the defendant in slander and libel over allegations arising from interviews concerning an incident said to have occurred when the defendant was a schoolgirl, subsequent television broadcasts, and publications in an online memoir and eBook.
The claimant applied to extend the limitation period for the BBC interview claim and to amend his pleading so that the ITV words were actionable without proof of special damage. The court also had to determine whether the defendant was liable for broadcasts as a co-publisher, whether the publications were true, and whether the eBook identified the claimant and constituted a real and substantial tort.
Held
The application under Limitation Act 1980, sections 4A and 32A, was refused. The claimant knew the relevant facts by the broadcast of the BBC interview on 22 October 2012, but waited about nine months before sending a letter before claim and almost another month before issuing proceedings. There was no adequate explanation for the delay. The prejudice to the claimant and defendant was not great, and the equitable discretion was therefore not exercised.
Permission was granted to amend the claim concerning the ITV words. The words were arguably actionable per se because they were likely to disparage the claimant in his profession and imputed an indecent assault punishable with imprisonment under section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956.
The defendant was not liable for the BBC Panorama broadcast. The interview referred only to a famous person. The claimant became identifiable only through the BBC's additional footage. The defendant neither intended nor authorised that composite publication. The court tentatively agreed with the views expressed in Berezovsky v Terluk [2011] EWCA Civ 1534 that reasonable foreseeability of republication did not itself establish co-publication liability, and the evidence in any event negatived foreseeability of this identifying broadcast.
The defendant did authorise the ITV broadcasts and was a co-publisher of them. The ITV words named the claimant and meant that he had groped, frightened and humiliated the defendant when she was under 16. The claimant could rely on both pleaded categories of slander actionable per se.
The defendant established justification on the ordinary civil standard. The court found it more likely than not that the claimant had touched the defendant's bottom and had humiliated her by calling her a derogatory name. The seriousness of the allegation required careful scrutiny of the evidence, applying the approach in Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1772, but did not alter the balance-of-probabilities standard. The claims based on the ITV words and broadcasts therefore failed.
The eBook claim also failed. The central allegations were true. The unproved allegation that the defendant and Jimmy Savile encouraged under-age girls to drink alcohol did not materially add to the sting, so section 5 of the Defamation Act 1952 applied. In any event, the publication was not shown to have identified the claimant to a significant number of readers and did not constitute a real and substantial tort.
All claims failed. Judgment was entered for the defendant.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
First-instance judgment. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.
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