Millett v Corbyn

In a defamation reference-innuendo claim, the court asks whether a reasonable person possessing the pleaded extrinsic facts would understand the words to refer to the claimant. Actual publication to, or actual understanding by, such persons is not required at the preliminary meaning stage. A proposed amendment adding new reference facts after limitation requires the claim to arise from the same or substantially the same facts and must also satisfy the discretionary principles governing late defamation amendments. Statements describing conduct as disruptive or abusive may be factual allegations where, in context, they imply that the claimant did something specific. Defamatory tendency is assessed by reference to shared values in modern society, and serious allegations made by a prominent public figure in a widely viewed broadcast may satisfy the seriousness threshold.

The claimant, a blogger and commentator, brought a defamation claim concerning remarks made by the defendant during a televised interview. The remarks concerned two unnamed people who had attended a parliamentary meeting and were said to have behaved disruptively and abusively towards a speaker. The claimant relied on extrinsic publications to establish that the remarks referred to him.

The court tried preliminary issues concerning reference, meaning, whether the words were fact or opinion, and defamatory tendency. The claimant also sought permission to amend his Particulars of Claim to rely on further publications. The central questions were whether the original publications established reference, whether the proposed amendments should be permitted after expiry of the limitation period, and what legal character the words bore.

1. Reference. A reference innuendo depends on the publication complained of together with external facts known to the reasonable reader. The court determines whether a reasonable person with the relevant extrinsic knowledge would understand the words to refer to the claimant. Actual viewers possessing that knowledge, and their actual understanding, were matters for serious harm rather than the preliminary reference issue. The original publications sufficiently identified the claimant.
2. Amendment. The proposed additional claims arose from the same or substantially the same facts as the existing claims and therefore passed the threshold under CPR 17.4(2). However, the claimant had not adequately explained his nine-month delay after expiry of the one-year limitation period. Permission to amend was refused. The court regarded a full and frank witness-statement explanation as ordinarily important in a late defamation amendment application.
3. Meaning and fact or opinion. The words conveyed that the claimant had behaved so disruptively at a House of Commons meeting that the police wished to remove him, had behaved disruptively at other meetings, and had been extremely abusive towards the speaker, causing distress. In context, these were factual allegations about conduct, not merely evaluative comment. The words implied that the claimant had done something specific but did not set out the precise acts.
4. Defamatory tendency and seriousness. Accusing a person of seriously abusive conduct towards a public speaker, in circumstances suggesting possible police ejection, was contrary to shared values in a modern democratic society. The allegation affected both personal character and professional reputation. Given the defendant’s prominence, the careful televised interview, and the programme’s wide broadcast, the allegation satisfied the common-law seriousness threshold.
5. The court found that the words referred to the claimant, bore the defamatory meaning identified, and were factual allegations. Permission to amend to rely on the additional publications was refused.

First-instance determination of preliminary issues in the High Court. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.