Otuo v Watch Tower Bible And Tract Society of Britain

In defamation claims concerning religious disciplinary communications, an imputation of fraud may be actionable per se where it conveys criminal fraud for which imprisonment is possible. The religious context may inform the speakers’ state of mind, but does not necessarily give the word “fraud” a special meaning outside ordinary criminal fraud.

Publication causes no actionable reputational harm where the recipients already knew the underlying allegations, decisions and material facts, and the publication does not alter their view of the claimant. Communications made within an established religious relationship may attract qualified privilege where there is a reciprocal moral or religious duty and interest. The privilege is defeated only by malice, requiring proof of a dominant improper motive or absence of honest belief.

The claimant brought two slander claims. Claim 1 concerned an announcement that he was no longer one of Jehovah’s Witnesses, made following his disfellowshipping for fraud. Claim 2 concerned questions put to him at a meeting convened to consider his request for reinstatement.

The earlier proceedings determined the meanings conveyed by the publications. The trial concerned whether the words were actionable per se, whether they caused sufficient reputational harm, and whether the defendants established consent, truth, qualified privilege, absence of malice, ultra vires arguments, authorisation or vicarious liability, and Convention-rights defences.

1. Meaning and actionability. The word “fraud”, viewed in its context, referred to fraud within the scope of Fraud Act 2006. The Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Primary Definition plainly connoted dishonesty and overlapped with fraud by false representation. The religious setting did not materially alter that meaning on these facts. Both publications therefore imputed a crime for which imprisonment was possible and were actionable per se.
2. Reputational harm. Claim 2 failed because the three recipients already knew the relevant history, had formed their own views and were not influenced adversely by the words. Claim 1 likewise failed. The six Elders who received the announcement already knew of the investigation, the decisions and their basis. The further alleged Insiders were also likely to have learned of the findings before the announcement. Neither claim crossed the common-law threshold of seriousness.
3. Consent and privilege. The claimant consented to the discussion at the reinstatement meeting, expressly or by conduct. The meeting was convened to assess repentance, and discussion of the ground for disfellowshipping was proper and probably necessary. Both publications were also made on occasions of qualified privilege. The Elders had a religious and moral duty to communicate or assess the relevant information, and the recipients had a corresponding interest.
4. Malice. The privilege was not defeated. The defendants’ witnesses and documents demonstrated honest belief, even if their reasoning might have been legally unsophisticated or mistaken. The claimant did not prove knowledge of falsity, recklessness or a dominant improper motive.
5. Other issues. The disfellowshipping was not ultra vires. The congregation’s charity constitution was not a complete code of religious membership or discipline. Watch Tower Britain neither authorised nor was vicariously liable for the publications; the relevant religious functions were performed by the congregational Elders, the Governing Body or CCJW. The Convention-rights arguments did not alter the result.
6. Disposition. Both claims were dismissed. No relief was awarded.

The judgment records earlier interlocutory and appellate decisions in the same litigation, including [2017] EWCA Civ 136 and [2019] EWHC 571 (QB). This was the trial judgment, which dismissed both claims.