Regina -v- London Borough of Camden Ex parte Pereira

For priority need under section 59(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1985, vulnerability is assessed by asking whether, while homeless, the applicant is less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person, so that injury or detriment will result when a less vulnerable person would cope without harmful effects.

The applicant need not establish a separate, general disadvantage in obtaining accommodation. Difficulty in obtaining accommodation may be relevant evidence, but it is an aspect of the composite assessment. The risk of injury or detriment resulting from inability to cope while homeless remains essential. A decision applying the two-stage approach in Ortiz v City of Westminster was quashed.

Mr Pereira applied to the London Borough of Camden for accommodation as a homeless person with a priority need. He relied on psychiatric vulnerability associated with a history of drug dependence and the risk of relapse if required to live in a hostel or drug-using environment.

The Council concluded that he was not vulnerable if homeless. Mr Justice Tucker refused judicial review. The appeal concerned whether the Council had applied the correct statutory test, and also raised issues of irrationality, procedural fairness and irrelevant considerations.

1. Appeal allowed. The Council’s determination was quashed and the matter was remitted for a fresh determination if Mr Pereira chose to apply again. The Council was required to reconsider priority need on the statutory criterion and to take account of all available evidence and further submissions.
2. Under section 59(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1985, the question is whether the applicant is vulnerable as a result of mental illness or handicap, physical disability or another special reason. The assessment is composite. The applicant must be less able to fend for himself while homeless than an ordinary homeless person, with a resulting risk of injury or detriment which that ordinary person would avoid.
3. The assessment assumes that the applicant is homeless, or is made on that assumption. Priority need is a separate question from homelessness and from the later question of how suitable accommodation is to be provided. A particular inability to obtain accommodation may be relevant where it demonstrates inability to cope with homelessness, but it is not an independent hurdle.
4. The two-hurdle approach stated in Ortiz v City of Westminster was not a correct statement of the law. The Council’s officers had probably treated the applicant’s ability to search for and obtain accommodation as decisive and had therefore applied the wrong legal test. The dictum in Ortiz v City of Westminster was no longer good law. The same applied to the approach in ex parte Di Dominico.
5. The decision was not Wednesbury unreasonable on the evidence, and there was no separate procedural unfairness or obligation to invite further submissions. References to the scarcity of housing and comparison with other applicants did not independently invalidate the decision.
6. The approach in ex parte Sangeramano and ex parte Carroll, insofar as it suggested a different test, should not be followed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [1998] EWCA Civ 863: allowed the appeal, set aside the refusal of judicial review, and ordered reconsideration of priority need.
• High Court, Administrative Court: Mr Justice Tucker refused judicial review of the Council’s decision.