Hamilton v Al Fayed

The rule against collateral attack does not automatically bar a defamation claim concerning conduct previously investigated by Parliament. Courts must not question the fairness of Parliament’s internal procedures or directly criticise parliamentary proceedings. However, a later court may determine a civil claim arising from an external publication, even if its factual conclusions differ from Parliament’s.

Such a claim may be abusive in exceptional circumstances, particularly where the claimant’s real purpose is to attack the parliamentary process or the proceedings threaten Parliament’s authority. Section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 permits a person to waive parliamentary privilege in defamation proceedings, notwithstanding a prior parliamentary investigation.

Mostyn Neil Hamilton brought libel proceedings against Mohammed Al Fayed over statements broadcast in a Channel 4 documentary. The statements alleged that Mr Hamilton had accepted cash and other benefits in return for parliamentary services.

Earlier libel proceedings by Mr Hamilton against The Guardian had been stayed because their investigation would infringe parliamentary privilege, but the stay was later lifted following the enactment of section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996. Those proceedings were withdrawn. Parliament subsequently investigated allegations concerning Mr Hamilton through the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, the Committee on Standards and Privileges and the House of Commons.

Popplewell J refused Mr Al Fayed’s application to strike out the new claim as an abuse of process. The central issues on appeal were whether the claim was a collateral attack on Parliament, whether the parliamentary investigation constituted proceedings in Parliament, and the effect of section 13.

1. Appeal dismissed. The application to strike out the libel claim was refused. The order was made with costs payable forthwith, and leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
2. The principle in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1982] AC 529 concerns collateral attack through re-litigation after a full and fair determination by a competent court. Its application requires consideration of the procedural quality of the earlier proceedings. Article 9 prevented the court from judging Parliament’s internal procedures, so the defendant could not obtain the benefit of the principle without accepting that burden.
3. The Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards’ inquiry and report, the Committee on Standards and Privileges’ hearings and report, and the House of Commons’ resolution constituted proceedings in Parliament. The court could not review or criticise the internal procedures adopted in those proceedings. The Committee had at least left the Commissioner’s findings on alleged cash payments undisturbed.
4. Article 9 did not prevent the court from hearing a libel claim based on an external publication, provided the proceedings did not criticise parliamentary proceedings. The wider constitutional principle likewise did not automatically bar a claim merely because it overlapped with a parliamentary investigation. Strike-out could be justified only where additional features showed a threat to Parliament’s authority, such as a real purpose to attack the parliamentary process. That threshold was not met.
5. Section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 allowed a person to waive parliamentary privilege in defamation proceedings. Subsection (2) permitted evidence, questions, statements, comments and findings about that person’s conduct. The statute contained no qualification removing that effect where Parliament had investigated the subject matter.
6. The Article 6 ECHR arguments were unnecessary to decide. The court observed that Strasbourg jurisprudence would not have required disapplication of a constitutional rule protecting Parliament if such a rule had applied.

• Court of Appeal: Appeal from Popplewell J’s judgment of 31 July 1998 dismissed. The judge had refused to strike out the libel claim as an abuse of process.
• Queen’s Bench Division: Popplewell J refused the defendant’s strike-out application.