Yeo v Times Newspapers Ltd

At a pre-trial review, the court declined to determine broad “ground rules” concerning parliamentary privilege without a properly particularised application. Issues concerning Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 depended on the detail of the evidence and pleadings.

A claimant could not maintain a pleaded case requiring the defendant to explain its investigation and then prevent a relevant and proportionate response. A defamation claim based on reference innuendo could proceed on inference where the inference was realistic rather than fanciful. Findings of parliamentary bodies were inadmissible to prove the issues in the action, and a party’s own account of what was said to such bodies was impermissible self-corroboration. Costs incurred before approval could not be authorised retrospectively under PD3E 7.6.

This was a pre-trial review in Yeo v Times Newspapers Ltd, a libel action arising from articles published in June 2013 concerning the claimant, a former Member of Parliament. The defendant relied on truth, fair comment or honest opinion, and responsible journalism on a matter of public interest.

The court considered applications concerning parliamentary privilege, the admissibility of evidence about parliamentary proceedings, the viability of the claim concerning the second article, the removal of irrelevant evidence and pleadings, and revision of the claimant’s costs budget. The central procedural questions were whether the claim relating to the second article had a realistic prospect of success, what evidence could properly be relied on, and whether the claimed costs satisfied the applicable costs rules.

1. Parliamentary privilege. The invitation to lay down general ground rules under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 was refused. The issues were constitutionally important and fact-sensitive, but no properly particularised application identified the passages or orders sought. The claimant was required either to trim the Reply so that the defendant no longer needed to justify its investigation and use of subterfuge, or to make a precise application supported by detailed reasons. A claimant could not maintain such a pleaded case while preventing the defendant from answering it in a relevant and proportionate way.
2. Claim concerning the 23 June article. The application to strike out or obtain summary judgment was refused. The claim depended on reference innuendo: readers of the second article might identify the unnamed select committee chairman by recalling the earlier articles. The essential issues were the number of such readers and whether that number amounted to a real and substantial tort. Evidence from individual readers was not essential. The court could draw an inference where it was realistic, having regard to the newspaper’s circulation, reader loyalty, the prominence of the earlier articles and the short interval between publication. The claim was not fanciful.
3. Evidence and pleadings. The claimant accepted that he could not rely on what he had said to the Parliamentary Commissioner or Standards Committee, or on findings in the Standards Report. Such evidence constituted impermissible self-corroboration or inadmissible reliance on findings by another decision-maker. Complaints that the defendant had delayed or deliberately withheld recordings from the Commissioner were struck out because determining them would require the court to pass judgment on parliamentary proceedings.
4. Costs budget. The application to approve the substantial costs revision under PD3E 7.6 was refused. That provision concerned future costs following a significant development and could not approve costs incurred before the revised budget. The repeal of section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 was not itself a development in the litigation, particularly where waiver had not previously been a real consideration. Any future application costs might require consideration under PD3E 7.9 or CPR 3.18(b). An additional £450 for trial costs was approved.

Not stated in the judgment.