London Borough Of Haringey v Awaritefe

A procedural defect in a housing-benefit notice does not automatically invalidate the authority’s determination or prevent recovery in the County Court. The court must assess the statutory purpose and the substantive harm caused by the breach. Substantial compliance may suffice where the affected person received the substance of the decision and had a real opportunity to seek review, but suffered no significant prejudice or injustice. A person from whom recovery is sought is a person affected by the determination and must be given access to the statutory review process.

The London Borough of Haringey appealed from an order of HHJ Cowell setting aside a District Judge’s order requiring Mrs Awaritefe to repay £1,015.66 in housing-benefit overpayments, with £126 costs. The overpayments had been paid directly to her as landlord after the tenant had left the premises. The authority’s notices did not precisely comply with paragraphs 2 to 5 of Schedule 6 to the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987, including information about review rights.

The central questions were whether the notices were sufficiently compliant, whether the defects invalidated the authority’s determination or its County Court claim, and whether the respondent had suffered substantial harm or injustice.

1. Appeal allowed. The District Judge’s order was restored, awarding the appellants £1,015.66 and £126 costs. There was no order as to the costs of the appeal.
2. A person from whom recovery of a housing-benefit overpayment is sought is a person affected by the determination and is entitled to the statutory review rights. Substantive issues concerning entitlement, amount and recoverability are addressed through the statutory review and appeal procedures.
3. The governing approach is to assess the statutory purpose and the substantive harm caused by procedural non-compliance. Technical defects do not automatically invalidate a determination. Substantial compliance may suffice where the affected person received the essential information and had a meaningful opportunity to seek review.
4. The February and April 1993 notices did not comply literally with paragraphs 2 to 5 of Schedule 6. They nevertheless gave the reasons, amount and relevant benefit weeks, and informed the respondent that she could write again to appeal. She had access to advice, and there was no evidence that a further review would have been refused. The defects caused no substantial injustice.
5. The case was materially different from Warwick District Council v Freeman, where the authority had refused to review the landlord’s challenge. Regulations 78(1) and (2), read with section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978, also supported treating the April letter as received in the ordinary course of post.
6. Pill LJ agreed in the result and that no substantive harm had been caused, but considered that a statutory tribunal’s fact-finding function could not be substituted by County Court findings. The court left open whether factual or public-law challenges could be raised in recovery proceedings.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal allowed; the order of HHJ Cowell was set aside and the District Judge’s award restored. [1999] EWCA Civ 1491.
• West London County Court: HHJ Cowell allowed the respondent’s appeal from the District Judge, holding that breaches of Schedule 6 were fatal to recovery.
• Edmonton County Court: District Judge Allen ordered repayment of £1,015.66 with £126 costs.