Agodzo v Bristol City Council

For county court jurisdiction, the substance of proceedings matters more than the form of the remedy. Where a statute provides that a sum may be recovered as a simple contract debt, the sum is treated as such for procedural and other litigation purposes. An action concerning that sum may therefore be founded on contract, even if the underlying liability is statutory and the claimant seeks only declarations. Subsequent recovery of the sum through a land charge does not remove jurisdiction that existed when proceedings were begun. A general power to grant declarations operates only once proceedings are within the county court’s jurisdiction. Whether declaratory relief should be granted is a separate discretionary question, ordinarily considered after the merits rather than at a preliminary jurisdiction hearing.

Dr Agodzo owned property served by a private sewer. Under the Building Act 1984, Bristol City Council carried out works and sought to recover from him his attributed share of the expenses. The expenses were registered as a charge on the property. Mortgagees later paid the charged sum following repossession and sale, but Agodzo continued to dispute whether the expenses were reasonably incurred.

After allegations of fraud were removed from his amended proceedings, Bristol County Court, on a preliminary point, held that it had no jurisdiction and ordered costs against him. The appeal concerned whether his pre-emptive claim for declarations, relating to a sum recoverable as a simple contract debt, fell within the county court’s jurisdiction despite the subsequent recovery of the sum.

1. Appeal allowed. Mr Justice Holman delivered the leading judgment, with Lord Justice Henry agreeing. The order of His Honour Judge Ticehurst that there was no jurisdiction was set aside in full, with costs.
2. Section 38(1) of the County Courts Act 1984 gives the county court power to make orders available to the High Court, including declarations. That power operates only where the proceedings are of a kind which the county court has jurisdiction to hear and determine. The fact that the claimant seeks only declaratory relief does not itself decide jurisdiction; the underlying subject matter is controlling.
3. Section 107(4) of the Building Act 1984, providing that sums recoverable under the Act may be recovered as a simple contract debt, has effect for procedural and other purposes connected with litigation. It is not confined to incidents such as limitation or summary judgment. A claim by the local authority for expenses under section 99(2) was therefore an action founded on contract for section 15(1) of the County Courts Act 1984. The same characterisation applied to Agodzo’s action concerning that sum. Section 16 could also have supported an action by the authority for recovery.
4. The court relied on [1956] 1 QB 573, where Lord Evershed MR treated equivalent wording as meaning that the claim was to be treated as though it were a simple contract debt, thereby defining county court jurisdiction. The decision supported the construction of section 107(4).
5. The merits of whether the expenses were reasonably incurred had not been decided. A declaration is discretionary, and the court might ultimately decline relief. That discretion is ordinarily more appropriately exercised after a hearing than as a preliminary jurisdiction point. Lord Justice Henry additionally questioned the economic sense of litigating the issue and suggested mediation, but recognised that this was outside the court’s remit.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). On 27 May 1999, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the county court’s order and awarded costs. The judgment is reported at [1999] EWCA Civ 1517.
• Bristol County Court. On 27 May 1998, His Honour Judge Ticehurst upheld the respondent’s preliminary jurisdiction objection, ordered that there be no jurisdiction to hear the action and awarded costs against Dr Agodzo.