Huxley v Child Support Officer & Anor

A child support officer may require information about an absent parent’s new household when making the initial maintenance calculation. A “maintenance assessment” may refer to the relevant stage of the assessment process, including the protected-income calculation; it need not be a completed assessment made without applying the protected-income provisions.

Refusal to provide requested information is not “unavoidable delay” merely because the absent parent objects to disclosure or considers the information unnecessary. Natural justice requires both parties to receive sufficient information to understand and challenge the assessment. The statutory formula may include an amount reflecting the needs of the parent with care, because the child’s needs may encompass at least some of the carer’s needs.

Mr Huxley appealed from a Child Support Commissioner’s dismissal of his appeal concerning an interim maintenance assessment. The assessment had been made after he failed to return a maintenance enquiry form.

He argued that the child support officer had no power to seek his second wife’s income or his housing costs before completing an initial assessment. He also objected to the possible disclosure of that information to his former wife, challenged the treatment of the parent with care and alleged inaccuracies concerning her household and income.

The central issues were the meaning of “maintenance assessment”, the scope of the information-gathering powers and whether his delay was unavoidable.

1. Appeal dismissed. The child support officer was entitled to seek information about the absent parent’s household before completing the assessment and was entitled to make the interim maintenance assessment on that basis.
2. Lady Justice Hale held that “maintenance assessment” is context-sensitive. In paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 to the Child Support Act 1991, it means the calculation up to the point at which the protected-income level becomes relevant. It does not require a completed calculation which leaves the protected-income provisions out of account. Requiring the information at that stage avoids a duplicative two-stage inquiry.
3. Failure to provide the information was not unavoidable delay under regulation 8(6) of the Child Support (Maintenance Assessment Procedures) Regulations 1992. Mr Huxley chose not to provide it. He could have supplied information about his own income, producing a different and probably more favourable interim assessment.
4. The statutory confidentiality provision did not justify withholding the information. The notification requirements were minimum requirements. Natural justice required communication of information needed to explain the assessment to both parties, so that each could scrutinise, seek review of and appeal the result.
5. The court accepted that allegations concerning the parent with care’s partner, other income and payments under the court order could in principle justify review under section 18(6) of the 1991 Act. Those were factual matters for the appropriate fact-finding body and did not determine whether cancellation of the interim assessment was legally required.
6. The formula could include an amount for the parent with care. The child support scheme replaced relevant private-law powers and was fundamentally directed to the child’s maintenance. The needs of the carer could therefore be reflected in assessing the child’s needs. Lord Justice Pill and Lord Justice Auld agreed with Lady Justice Hale. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal from the decision of Child Support Commissioner Angus dated 31 July 1998, dismissing an appeal from the Chester Child Support Appeal Tribunal. Appeal dismissed.
• Child Support Commissioner: appeal dismissed; leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal granted.
• Chester Child Support Appeal Tribunal: appeal dismissed.
• Child support officer: refusal to cancel or review the interim maintenance assessment.