Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority v Robinson

A public body charged with statutory responsibilities in the public interest ordinarily has standing to seek an injunction preventing interference with their performance, unless the statutory scheme implies otherwise. Relief may address conduct outside the body's premises where that conduct sufficiently affects its statutory functions.

The jurisdiction remains equitable. An injunction should issue only when just and convenient. Relevant considerations include the seriousness of the interference, the body's existing powers, the order's likely effectiveness, its practical effect on third parties and any interference with freedom of expression. A public body cannot use its statutory responsibilities to vindicate the independent privacy or confidence rights of others.

A detained patient at Broadmoor arranged publication of a book describing his offence and disclosing information about fellow patients. The hospital authority and his responsible medical officer sought injunctions preventing publication and restricting distribution. They contended that publication would impede treatment, security and the maintenance of a therapeutic environment.

Colman J granted injunctions without notice, and Penry-Davis J continued one of them. Poole J subsequently discharged the orders and struck out allegations that the claimants possessed powers to prevent possession or publication outside Broadmoor. The claimants appealed.

The Court of Appeal considered whether a statutory body could obtain an injunction in civil proceedings to support its statutory duties and, if so, whether relief was appropriate on these facts.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. The members of the court agreed that the injunctions should not be granted, although their reasoning on the source and scope of the relevant power was not identical.

2. Lord Woolf MR held, with Waller LJ agreeing on the general formulation, that a public body required to perform statutory responsibilities in the public interest has standing, absent a contrary statutory implication, to seek an injunction preventing interference with those responsibilities. The court may grant relief where it is just and convenient. The existence of public rather than private law powers, duties or rights does not itself exclude the jurisdiction conferred by section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

3. An injunction may restrain conduct outside the institution where that conduct has a sufficiently significant effect on treatment, security, discipline or another statutory responsibility within it. The court must nevertheless require circumstances warranting interference with the defendant or a third party. Waller LJ considered that the patient's activity could not fairly be characterised as interference with the performance of Broadmoor's responsibilities and would have refused relief on that ground alone.

4. Lord Woolf MR held that relief should in any event be refused as a matter of discretion. An indefinite injunction against a compulsorily detained patient would rarely be appropriate. Broadmoor's internal powers were generally sufficient, enforcement against the patient presented practical difficulty, and caution was required where the order was intended principally to affect printers or publishers. No substantial risk to Broadmoor's statutory functions had been established. Freedom of expression at common law and under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, together with serious doubts about the order's effectiveness, reinforced the refusal.

5. Morritt LJ reached the same result because the asserted power to control publication could not be implied. A power interfering with free speech and copyright required a self-evident and pressing need and, given its constitutional significance, clear parliamentary language. The safeguards governing intercepted correspondence under sections 121 and 134 of the Mental Health Act 1983 could not adequately be replaced by judicial discretion. He nevertheless agreed that, had Parliament conferred the asserted statutory right, Broadmoor could have sought an injunction to enforce it.

6. The authority could not sue merely to protect the victim's family from distress or to enforce fellow patients' rights to privacy or confidence. Such matters were relevant only insofar as the complained-of conduct affected Broadmoor's own statutory responsibilities. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

1. Court of Appeal: The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The court upheld the discharge of the injunctions, although its members differed concerning the source and scope of the asserted power. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

2. Queen's Bench Division, Poole J: The injunctions were discharged. Parts of the statement of claim asserting powers to prevent possession or publication outside Broadmoor were ordered to be amended or struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

3. Queen's Bench Division, Penry-Davis J: One of the injunctions granted without notice was continued on 18 May 1998.

4. Queen's Bench Division, Colman J: Injunctions restraining publication and requiring delivery up were granted without notice on 1 May 1998.