Worcestershire County Council v Tongue & Ors

A local authority may use civil proceedings to obtain an injunction restraining a continuing breach of criminal law where statutory conditions and the public interest justify that course. That jurisdiction does not authorise relief which goes beyond enforcing the criminal law and supplies powers Parliament has withheld.

In particular, a disqualification from custody of animals does not entitle a civil court to authorise a local authority to enter the disqualified person’s land, remove all livestock and dispose of it. The statutory animal-welfare scheme confines such powers to defined circumstances and, under Protection of Animals (Amendment) Act 2000, to animals to which the relevant cruelty offence relates. A local authority’s general animal-welfare functions do not give it a sufficient proprietary or analogous interest to obtain wider relief.

The Council prosecuted the respondents for cruelty to cattle and obtained lifetime orders disqualifying each from custody of animals other than cats and dogs. It later alleged that they continued to keep cattle. In civil proceedings, it sought authority to enter their farms, remove all livestock, take custody of it and sell, dispose of or slaughter it.

Neuberger J found that the respondents retained custody of the cattle in breach of the disqualification orders and that an alleged transfer to a third party was a sham. He nevertheless dismissed the claim, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested removal and disposal order. The Council appealed. The central issue was whether the civil court could grant that relief in aid of the criminal law.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. The requested order was not a conventional injunction restraining a continuing criminal breach. Its substance was to give the Council authority to enter privately owned land, remove livestock owned by the respondents, and assume powers of care, disposal and slaughter.

2. A local authority acting under section 222(1)(a) of the Local Government Act 1972 may seek an injunction to restrain breaches of criminal law. The exceptional use of civil proceedings requires more than proof of an infringement. But section 222 did not confer jurisdiction to grant every measure thought likely to prevent a continuing offence. It could support an injunction preventing the respondents from having custody of livestock; it did not support a transfer of control over their cattle to the Council.

3. The detailed statutory scheme was decisive. An order under section 2 of the Protection of Animals (Amendment) Act 2000 could authorise many of the measures sought, but only concerning the animals to which the cruelty offence related. The Council’s proposed order extended to all livestock on the respondents’ land, including animals in respect of which no cruelty offence had been established. It therefore went beyond the criminal court’s powers and sought to fill an asserted gap in criminal law, which the civil court could not do.

4. The Council’s general statutory functions relating to animal welfare gave it no sufficient legal, equitable or analogous interest in the cattle to found the wider relief under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Nor did continued breach of the disqualification orders amount to the kind of unconscionable conduct that could enlarge the court’s injunctive jurisdiction.

5. The court confirmed that an injunction restraining custody of animals in breach of the disqualification orders could properly be granted and enforced by civil sanctions. The Council had not sought that limited relief alone.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The Council’s appeal was dismissed. The court upheld the refusal to authorise entry onto the respondents’ land and removal and disposal of their livestock.
• High Court (Chancery Division, Birmingham District Registry): Neuberger J dismissed the Council’s claim for the requested removal order, while finding that the respondents had custody of cattle in breach of their disqualification orders.