Ebert v Venvil (Ebert v Birch)

The High Court has an inherent jurisdiction to restrain a litigant from commencing specified fresh proceedings without leave where their commencement would probably abuse the court’s process. The jurisdiction extends beyond applications in existing proceedings, but it must be exercised only in a clear and serious case. The restraint must be certain, proportionate and confined to the identified abuse.

The statutory regime under Supreme Court Act 1981, section 42, remains the route for an order of the same comprehensive width as a statutory vexatious-litigant order. A properly confined inherent-jurisdiction order may also cover proceedings in the County Court. Relitigation of matters already determined, or raised unsuccessfully in earlier proceedings, is an abuse of process.

The applicant had pursued repeated proceedings arising from his bankruptcy and from the assignment of a debt by Midland Bank plc to Ralph Wolff. Neuberger J made orders in July and October 1998 requiring him to obtain leave before taking further steps or commencing specified proceedings against the relevant parties. The later order extended to proceedings in the High Court and County Court.

The applicant sought leave to appeal against those orders and against the striking out of an originating summons issued without leave. The summons sought to challenge the assignment, the underlying debt and related matters. The Court of Appeal considered whether the inherent jurisdiction supported the extended restraint and whether the summons improperly sought to relitigate matters determined in the bankruptcy proceedings.

1. The applications for leave to appeal were dismissed. The court upheld Neuberger J’s orders and held that any appeal on jurisdiction would be bound to fail.
2. The established Grepe v Loam jurisdiction to control abusive applications in existing proceedings was not confined to proceedings already commenced. The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of its process could, in an appropriate case, restrain a litigant from beginning identified fresh proceedings without leave. The anticipated proceedings had to present a sufficiently serious and imminent risk of abusive litigation and loss to those affected.
3. The statutory jurisdiction under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 had not abolished the limited inherent jurisdiction. Its safeguards nevertheless confined that inherent power. An order as wide as the statutory scheme should be sought under the statute. An inherent-jurisdiction order required a clear case, had to be sufficiently certain, and left open access to the court for an arguably meritorious claim. Proper use of that power did not infringe article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
4. The High Court could make such an order in respect of anticipated County Court proceedings. The order operated personally against the litigant, and both courts formed part of the same civil justice system.
5. The originating summons was properly struck out. The validity and effect of the assignment, and the debt on which the bankruptcy rested, had already been investigated in the annulment proceedings. Reopening them in proceedings against the bank was an abuse of process. The summons had also been issued without the leave required by the July order.

No order for costs was made, save that the trustee’s costs were to be paid out of the estate.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the applicant’s applications for leave to appeal and upheld the extended leave requirements imposed by Neuberger J.
• Chancery Division (in Bankruptcy): Neuberger J made orders on 7 July and 23 October 1998 restraining specified further steps and fresh proceedings without leave, and struck out the applicant’s originating summons.