Hanson v DB Wadham-Smith & Ors

The Court of Appeal may refuse permission where an applicant seeks to reopen litigation after exhausting the available avenues of challenge. The power under CPR 23.11 to relist an application made in a party’s absence is discretionary and does not provide an indirect route to rehear an order already unsuccessfully challenged. A Grepe v Loam order may properly restrain renewed proceedings concerning matters already litigated, while preserving the right to seek permission to take further steps. Such an order must be sufficiently certain and limited to the proceedings or matters to which it relates.

Christine Hanson brought negligence proceedings concerning the purchase and subsequent disposal of a flat. Claims against the Woolwich Building Society and Westminster City Council had been disposed of, leaving proceedings against solicitors practising as Wadham-Smith & Co. Master Ungley struck out the amended claim. Applications for permission to appeal that decision were refused by Blofeld J on paper and by Sullivan J after an oral hearing.

Miss Hanson then applied under CPR 23.11(2) to relist an application concerning the strike-out. Roderick Evans J refused that application. Eady J subsequently made a Grepe v Loam order restricting the relitigation of matters in the proceedings without permission. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether permission should be granted to appeal against those decisions.

1. Applications refused. Lord Justice Pill dealt with both applications on the documents because the applicant and her proposed MacKenzie Friend did not attend after an adjournment had been refused.
2. The applicant had exhausted her remedies in relation to Master Ungley’s strike-out order. The earlier applications for permission to appeal had been considered and refused. The Court of Appeal therefore saw no basis for reopening that matter indirectly through CPR 23.11(2), and there was no arguable case for ordering a rehearing before the Master. The broader complaints about the earlier proceedings did not require determination.
3. The power under CPR 23.11(2) is discretionary. Although the Court did not decide definitively whether a further application for permission to appeal lay against the decision of Roderick Evans J, any such permission had to be refused because the proposed appeal could not succeed.
4. The Grepe v Loam order made by Eady J was justified. Following Ebert v Venvil [2000] Ch 484, the High Court has jurisdiction to prevent the initiation of civil proceedings likely to constitute an abuse of process, provided the order is sufficiently certain. The order was confined to the identified Queen’s Bench Division proceedings and matters already in dispute. It did not treat the applicant as a vexatious litigant or prevent her from bringing unrelated claims.
5. The order properly preserved the possibility of applying in writing to a Queen’s Bench Division judge for permission to take further action concerning the disputed matters. Both applications for permission to appeal were refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal against the decisions of Roderick Evans J and Eady J refused.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Roderick Evans J refused an application under CPR 23.11(2) to relist the matter. Eady J made a Grepe v Loam order.