Hannigan v Hannigan & Ors

A court should not strike out a claim which was sealed within the limitation period solely because its commencement documents contain technical procedural defects. Where the documents give the defendant full notice of the claim, the court should consider the relevant relief factors and all the circumstances. It should give decisive weight to the interests of justice and to the effect on the parties.

Under CPR 3.10, correction of an error is technically distinct from relief from an automatic sanction. The solicitor’s culpable mistakes may justify costs consequences, but should not deprive the client of a determination on the merits where strike-out would be a disproportionate windfall for the opposing party.

The claimant, the widow of the deceased, sought further reasonable financial provision from his estate under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. Her solicitor issued documents on the final day of the six-month period. They stated the claim and supporting evidence, but used an obsolete petition form and contained a number of formal defects.

A district judge struck out the proceedings. On appeal, Judge Rubery refused relief, despite accepting that the claimant might be unable to pursue a fresh claim. The claimant appealed to the Court of Appeal. The central issue was whether the circuit judge had erred in exercising his discretion by allowing procedural irregularities, rather than the merits and practical justice of the case, to determine the claim.

Appeal allowed unanimously. Brooke LJ gave the leading judgment. Robert Walker LJ agreed, and Peter Gibson LJ expressed complete agreement.

1. The circuit judge’s exercise of discretion was seriously flawed. He concentrated on numerous formal defects while failing to consider that the sealed documents, served within the limitation period, told the defendants exactly what relief was sought and why. The strike-out was a disproportionate response to irregularities which caused no substantive uncertainty.

2. The court was therefore bound to exercise the discretion afresh. Although the claimant had sought relief under CPR 3.9, CPR 3.10 was technically the applicable provision. The sanction resulted from the strike-out order under appeal, rather than automatically from a rule, practice direction or order. Nevertheless, when deciding whether to remedy such errors, the court should consider the relevant CPR 3.9(1) factors and all other relevant circumstances.

3. The decisive considerations were the interests of the administration of justice and the effect on the parties. The claim had been initiated in time, the defendants had full notice of it, and a refusal to correct the errors would prevent any merits determination and give the defendants an unjustified limitation advantage. The number of errors and the solicitor’s lack of a good explanation weighed against the claimant, but were overwhelmingly outweighed by those considerations.

4. The Civil Procedure Rules seek efficient litigation, but their overriding objective is justice between litigants. Parties must assist the court in achieving that objective. Technical non-compliance by a lawyer may warrant costs and other measures directed at the lawyer, but it should not deny the client justice where that denial would be unjust.

The proceedings were to be corrected rather than struck out. The claimant’s costs were ordered to be paid by the second defendant, with indemnity out of the estate as specified in the order.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the claimant’s appeal in [2000] EWCA Civ 159, set aside the refusal of relief, and directed that the procedural errors be corrected.

• Stafford County Court, Judge Rubery: On 15 December 1999, dismissed the claimant’s appeal from the district judge and refused relief from the strike-out.

• Stafford County Court, District Judge Rowley: On 25 August 1999, struck out the proceedings for non-compliance with procedural requirements.