A (A Child), Re

On an application for permission to appeal against a welfare-based contact decision, permission should be refused unless the appellant shows that the first-instance judge was plainly wrong, in the sense that the decision fell outside the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible. The child’s welfare remains paramount. Direct contact may properly be refused where it would expose the child to an unacceptable risk through continuing contact with another adult, and there is no realistic prospect of rehabilitation or adequate protection. A court may refuse direct post-adoption contact while proceeding on the basis that indirect contact will continue. If that basis is not honoured, a separate complaint may arise. The application was refused, although the court expressly supported indirect contact for the child’s benefit.

The father sought permission to appeal from Judge Davies’s order of 4 February 2000, which dismissed his application for contact with his three-year-old daughter, R. The child had been placed with prospective adopters after earlier care proceedings. A final care order had been made by Judge Price, and permission to appeal that order had been refused.

The father sought regular direct contact but had been unable to assure the court that contact would not lead to renewed contact between R and her mother, whose care of children had previously failed. The central issue was whether Judge Davies’s refusal of contact was plainly wrong and whether indirect contact after adoption should continue.

Per Lord Justice Ward:

1. Disposition and appellate threshold. The application for permission to appeal was refused. The appellate court could intervene only if Judge Davies’s decision was plainly wrong, meaning that it fell outside the generous ambit within which there was reasonable room for disagreement. The decision was within that range.
2. Welfare and risk. The child’s welfare was paramount in determining contact. The evidence supported the conclusion that continuing contact with the father would involve continuing contact with the mother, creating an unacceptable risk to R. The father remained unable to state that he would prevent R being introduced to her mother. There was no prospect of rehabilitation, and the refusal of direct contact was therefore upheld.
3. Adoption and indirect contact. Open adoptions could frequently be beneficial, but their availability did not make direct contact necessary. The decision was not outside the range of reasonable decisions merely because direct contact might have had benefits. Judge Davies had proceeded on the basis that indirect contact would continue, and that basis was expressly approved. If the father were prevented from maintaining that indirect contact, he might have a separate complaint.
4. Human rights and order. The court found no breach of human rights. The application was refused, and a copy of the judgment was ordered to be made available to the father at public expense.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 12 September 2000, Lord Justice Ward refused the father’s application for permission to appeal: [2000] EWCA Civ 404.
2. Portsmouth County Court: Judge Davies’s order of 4 February 2000 dismissed the father’s contact application, on the ground that continuing contact would create an unacceptable risk through continuing contact with the mother.
3. Earlier care proceedings: Judge Price had made a final care order, and permission to appeal that order had been refused.