Glen International & Anor, R (on Application of) v Greenwich

Mandatory renovation grants required by the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 must be approved where the relevant works are necessary to comply with notices under sections 189 or 190 of the Housing Act 1985. The absence of two estimates does not defeat the application or the duty to approve in such cases. The authority’s power under section 102(2)(b) to dispense with estimates operates as an obligation where necessary to fulfil the statutory scheme. The present tense in section 113 describes the necessity of the works when the notice is served, not a requirement that the application precede completion. Late applications remain subject to careful scrutiny, and extreme deficiencies may mean that no valid application has been made.

The Borough refused applications for mandatory renovation grants concerning properties owned by Glen International Ltd and Mrs Vijaya Radia. The applications related to works required by notices under sections 189 or 190 of the Housing Act 1985. The Borough relied principally on the absence or inadequacy of two estimates under section 102 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. It also contended that one application was invalid because the works had been completed before the application was made. Mr Justice Hidden quashed the refusals on 23 June 1998. The Borough appealed on the validity of the applications and the effect of completed works.

The appeal was dismissed unanimously, with costs.

1. The statutory scheme in Part VIII of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 distinguished between discretionary grants and grants which the authority was required to approve. Sections 113, 116 and 117 had to be read together with that mandatory purpose.
2. Although section 102(1) stated that no grant was payable unless an application was made in accordance with Part VIII and approved, section 102 could not be read as making two estimates an absolute precondition to a mandatory grant under section 113. The requirement for estimates was not universal. In a mandatory case, the discretion under section 102(2)(b) to dispense with estimates became an obligation where necessary to give effect to the statutory scheme. The applications therefore remained valid despite the absence or inadequacy of estimates.
3. The exclusion in section 108(2)(b) of applications required to be approved under section 113 from the prohibition in section 108(1) supported that conclusion. The use of the present tense in section 113(1), referring to works which were necessary to comply with the notices, concerned the position when the notices were served. It did not require the grant application to be made before the works were completed.
4. The application concerning Fairthorn Road was therefore validly made after completion of the works. In the Herbert Road and Gurdon Road cases, the Borough had no discretion to refuse approval merely because estimates were absent from the applications.
5. The decision did not encourage late or deficient applications. Claims could be carefully scrutinised under sections 116 and 117, and an application might be so deficient that it was not an application within section 113.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed. [2000] EWCA Civ 81.
• Queen’s Bench Division: Mr Justice Hidden quashed the Borough’s decisions refusing the renovation-grant applications on 23 June 1998.