Alderson & Anor v Stillorgan Sales Ltd

An adjournment of a civil trial is a matter of case-management discretion. The judge must weigh all relevant circumstances, including the apparent strength of the claim, the procedural history, the parties’ preparation, the likely value of further evidence, and the effect on court resources and other litigants.

A late expert report does not automatically justify an adjournment. Where the claimed injustice is remote and further time is unlikely to produce a viable challenge, refusal may be proper. An initial decision based on a material factual mistake may nevertheless be followed by a valid refusal after reconsideration on the correct facts.

The claimants bought a confectionery, tobacco and news agency business and alleged that the vendor had made negligent misrepresentations about its profitability. A jointly instructed accountant’s report was delivered shortly before the listed trial and was adverse to the claimants’ case.

Langley J refused applications to adjourn the trial. The first refusal proceeded on the mistaken basis that the case-management order requiring a joint expert had been made by consent. On reconsideration, with that error corrected, the judge again refused an adjournment. The claimants abandoned the claim and appealed. The central issue was whether further time should have been allowed for an accountant to consider and respond to the joint report.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed with costs, subject to detailed assessment. Kay LJ delivered the leading judgment and Schiemann LJ agreed, adding a further consideration.
2. Nature of the discretion. The decision whether to adjourn to permit further expert consideration was a discretionary case-management decision. The judge was required to consider all relevant circumstances, including the apparent strength of the claim, the lateness of the application, the procedural history, the parties’ preparation, the realistic prospect that further evidence would affect the result, and the disadvantage to other litigants if the listed trial were postponed.
3. Application of the factors. The claim was relatively weak. The claimants had allowed the proceedings to reach the eve of trial without taking steps to ensure that their accountant could consider the joint report or advise on challenging it. The claimed injustice therefore amounted only to a remote possibility that further evidence might improve the case. The court was entitled to conclude that there was no realistic prospect of success sufficient to justify further court time.
4. Effect of the earlier mistake. The first refusal could not stand because it was materially influenced by the mistaken belief that the case-management order had been made by consent. The renewed application was, however, reconsidered on the correct factual basis and the resulting exercise of discretion was lawful.
5. Additional consideration. Schiemann LJ emphasised that the order requiring the joint report had not been appealed. The parties had agreed to extend the report deadline while retaining the trial date and had given no indication that an adjournment might be sought. The report’s further three-day delay did not materially alter the position. The proposed pleading amendment, which was not pursued orally, was also described by Kay LJ as wholly hopeless.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed with costs subject to detailed assessment: [2001] EWCA Civ 1060.
• High Court at Winchester: Langley J refused adjournments on 2 and 3 October 2000. The claimants did not proceed with the trial and the claim was dismissed.