Stegers' Application For Judicial Review

Judicial review is not a routine means of challenging an adverse County Court decision, even where procedural error is alleged. The ordinary route is an appeal within the private litigation, not proceedings against the County Court itself. Describing judicial review as a remedy of last resort does not give an applicant an automatic right to use it after other appellate avenues have failed. Sections 7 and 9 of the Human Rights Act 1998 do not create a general remedy of judicial review for alleged procedural failures by County Court judges. Judicial review may remain available in appropriate cases involving inferior courts, statutory tribunals or administrative bodies, but it was unavailable on the complaints advanced here.

Mr Stegers brought a breach of contract claim in the Brighton County Court against solicitors who had acted for him in a personal injury claim. A Deputy District Judge dismissed the claim and ordered costs. Her Honour Judge Coates dismissed his appeal and made a further costs order.

Mr Stegers then commenced judicial review proceedings, alleging errors concerning a medical report, disclosure of documents and the handling of his case. Elias J refused permission on the papers, citing delay and the availability of an appeal. Turner J refused permission after an oral hearing. The issue before the Court of Appeal was whether those alleged County Court procedural errors could be challenged by judicial review, including by reliance on sections 7 and 9 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Lord Justice Pill refused the application.

1. The complaints arose from private County Court proceedings against solicitors. The Court of Appeal was not concerned with deciding whether the Circuit Judge had been right about the medical report or whether the disclosure arrangements involved procedural defects.
2. Judicial review can in appropriate circumstances apply to an inferior court, particularly where procedural defects are alleged in Magistrates' Court proceedings. The jurisdiction also extends to statutory tribunals and public bodies making administrative decisions. That principle does not create a routine right to judicially review County Court proceedings whenever a litigant loses.
3. Even an alleged procedural error by a County Court judge does not ordinarily justify a remedy against the court itself by judicial review. The appropriate course is to attempt an appeal within the private litigation and to pursue the successful parties in that litigation.
4. The applicant relied on sections 7 and 9 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The court considered those provisions but held that the Act did not create a general remedy for challenging County Court decisions by judicial review. Section 9(2) preserved the rule of law preventing a court from being subject to judicial review and, in this context, excluded a general judicial-review appeal based on alleged procedural failures by County Court judges.
5. The description of judicial review as a remedy of last resort did not give an applicant a right to invoke it after other avenues of appeal had failed. The decision was based on the absence of jurisdiction for the proposed challenge, not on the delay point. The application had no prospect of success and was refused.

Order: Application refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused the application for permission to appeal against Turner J's refusal of permission to apply for judicial review, [2001] EWCA Civ 1115.
2. Queen's Bench Division: Turner J refused permission to apply for judicial review after an oral hearing on 5 April 2001.
3. Queen's Bench Division: Elias J refused permission on the papers on 27 February 2001, citing delay and the availability of an appeal.
4. Brighton County Court: the Deputy District Judge dismissed the underlying claim on 24 June 1999. Her Honour Judge Coates dismissed the appeal on 7 April 2000.