Barnes v Suffolk Health Authority

[2001] EWCA Civ 1175

Case details

Case citations
[2001] EWCA Civ 1175
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
9 July 2001
Judgment text

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Subjects
Civil procedure Permission to appeal Strike out
Keywords
second appeal permission to appeal important point of principle or practice compelling reason reasonable prospect of success extension of time strike out clinical negligence case management
Outcome
applications for permission to appeal dismissed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Permission for a second appeal is subject to a mandatory and stringent threshold. The proposed appeal must raise an important point of principle or practice, or there must be another compelling reason for it to be heard. Permission may also be refused where the proposed appeal has no reasonable prospect of success. A case-management decision striking out claims after repeated extensions will not justify a further appeal where those requirements are unmet.

Factual background

Mrs Monica Barnes sought permission for a second appeal from orders made by His Honour Judge Jenkins in the Lincoln County Court on 19 March 2001. Those orders dismissed her appeals from District Judge Hickinbottom’s orders in the Worksop County Court, which had struck out two clinical-negligence claims against Bassetlaw National Health Service Trust and Suffolk Health Authority after refusing further extensions of time. The proceedings also involved an application concerning the Data Protection Act 1998. The central issue was whether the proposed appeals satisfied the statutory threshold for a second appeal and had a reasonable prospect of success.

Held

Lord Justice Robert Walker dismissed both applications for permission to appeal.

  1. The applications concerned second-tier appeals because Mrs Barnes sought to challenge the Lincoln County Court’s decisions after the District Judge’s orders had been upheld. Under section 55 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, such an appeal was permissible only if it raised an important point of principle or practice, or if there was some other compelling reason for it to be heard. This was a mandatory and stringent statutory requirement.
  2. The underlying claims had been struck out after Mrs Barnes failed to comply with the procedural requirements concerning particulars of claim and medical evidence within the extended timetable. The District Judge had considered the history, the previous involvement of solicitors and the time already available. Judge Jenkins had carefully examined that reasoning and found no basis to interfere with the exercise of discretion.
  3. The confusion between the three sets of proceedings was regrettable but was not sinister and did not provide a basis for appellate intervention. The application under the Data Protection Act 1998 was also mistaken.
  4. The proposed grounds did not satisfy the requirements for a second appeal, and an appeal would have no reasonable prospect of success. Both applications for permission to appeal were therefore dismissed. A copy of the transcript was supplied to the applicant at public expense.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  • Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 9 July 2001, Lord Justice Robert Walker dismissed both applications for permission to appeal.
  • Lincoln County Court: On 19 March 2001, His Honour Judge Jenkins dismissed Mrs Barnes’s appeals from the District Judge’s orders and rejected the application concerning the Data Protection Act 1998.
  • Worksop County Court: On 25 August 2000, District Judge Hickinbottom refused further extensions of time and struck out the two clinical-negligence claims.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
applications for permission to appeal dismissed

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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