Arab News Network & Anor v Al Khazen & Anor

In a defamation claim, the judge first determines the meanings which the words are reasonably capable of bearing. The judge must then decide whether any such meaning is capable of being defamatory, leaving the actual meaning to the jury where appropriate.

The words must be read as a whole and in context, from the perspective of the ordinary reasonable reader and with regard to the audience. The court should reject meanings which depend on strained, forced or unreasonable interpretation. A broadcaster’s adoption of a viewpoint different from an official political line, and its seeking commentators who express minority views, does not by itself convey a lack of impartiality or breach of broadcasting obligations.

The claimants appealed from Morland J’s decision of 28 March 2000 striking out their libel claim under the Civil Procedure Rules, Part 3.4(2)(a) and Schedule 1, rule 82.3A(2).

The claim concerned an Arabic-language editorial in Al Hayat about the dismissal of the second claimant’s father as Vice-President of Syria. The claimants alleged that the editorial accused them of acting as willing agents of American and Israeli schemes and alleged that the first claimant’s broadcasts lacked due impartiality and deceived advertisers and subscribers.

The central issue was whether the words were capable of bearing the pleaded natural and ordinary meanings or innuendo meanings.

1. Appeal dismissed. The words complained of were not capable of bearing any of the pleaded meanings, whether naturally and ordinarily or by way of innuendo, and were not capable of bearing any defamatory meaning alleged by the claimants.
2. The court adopted the established distinction between two issues. The judge determines the range of meanings of which the words are reasonably capable and whether any such meaning is capable of being defamatory. If a reasonably capable meaning could be regarded by a reasonable jury as defamatory, the jury determines the actual meaning as a question of fact. This distinction was explained by reference to Lewis v Daily Telegraph Limited [1964] AC 234 and Keays v Murdoch Magazines Limited [1991] 1 WLR 1184.
3. In determining capability of meaning, the court must read the publication as a whole and consider the impression it is capable of making on the ordinary reasonable reader. It must take account of the publication’s audience, but must reject meanings which require strained, forced or utterly unreasonable interpretation. The pleaded allegation that the claimants were willing American or Israeli agents could not reasonably be inferred from the editorial’s references to schemes involving weak people.
4. The innuendo alleging breach of broadcasting impartiality obligations also failed. Saying that a broadcaster adopted a line different from the official Syrian line, and sought writers and journalists representing minority views, was not capable of conveying a lack of impartiality or even-handedness. The related allegation of deception of advertisers and subscribers therefore also failed.
5. The court did not decide whether defamatory character should be assessed by society as a whole or by a particular community. Lord Justice Keene noted the difficulties of departing from the approach associated with Tolley v Fry [1930] 1 KB 467, while recognising that the issue might require consideration in a more diverse society.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal from the decision of Morland J dated 28 March 2000; appeal dismissed with costs.